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INTRODUCTION
Lynn Stout heartily embraced heterodox economic theories
for describing capital markets and a progressive zeal for reforming them. Yet when she came to formulate her policy prescriptions for financial markets, one of the most prominent
progressive corporate and financial law scholars of the twentieth century could sometimes take these twin intellectual engines into surprisingly “conservative” waters. Lynn’s landmark
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1999 article in the Duke Law Journal, “Why the Law Hates
Speculators” provides an example of her coming to the unexpected policy conclusions of returning to ancient solutions to
the problems of modern financial markets.1 She advocated for
identifying and reducing excessive financial speculation in derivatives markets by reviving the common law doctrine of insurable interest.2
This Article explores how a similar intellectual move—returning to common law or traditional approaches to financial
institution governance—can inform and improve a range of financial reforms. In particular, this Article seeks to revive the
use of organizational form as a tool of financial regulation.
Very old varietals, including partnerships and mutual companies, decanted in new bottles can promote financial stability,
lower incentives for excessive risk-taking by financial intermediaries, provide mechanisms to police their market conduct, and better align their incentives with the interests of their
customers and consumers.
In arguing for the use of organizational form as a regulatory tool, this Article examines a common but somewhat hidden thread running through a range of innovative,
contemporary scholarship on financial regulation. In a number of works, both the contemporaries and intellectual heirs of
Professor Stout have explored ways to “remutualize” ownership
of financial intermediaries. For instance, Professors Claire Hill
and Richard Painter argue that reintroducing elements of the
old partnership structure of investment banks would curb excessive risk-taking by, and change the culture of, those important financial intermediaries.3 Professor Saule Omarova moves
from the level of the firm to the level of industry and argues for
a self-regulatory legal regime in which large financial institutions would collectively bear the costs of systemically risky ac-

1
Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 777–78 (1999).
2
Id. at 777–82. Under this doctrine, insurance and, in turn, derivative
contracts are only legally enforceable if at least one of the parties uses the contract to transfer or hedge a preexisting risk. Id. at 725. If the contract involves the
transfer of risks to which neither counterparty was subject before the bargain was
struck, then courts would not enforce the agreement. Id. at 724–27. The operation of this rule can be seen in a simple example: the common law would not
enforce a contract in which one person purchases fire insurance for a neighbor’s
house.
3
See CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS:
PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 146–48 (2015).
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tivities and thus police each other’s behavior.4 Her ideas
harken back to historical structures in which exchanges were
mutually owned and regulated by the brokers who traded on
them.5 It also recalls how the organizational form used to operate on an industry-wide level: in the nineteenth century, large
banks formed clearinghouses that provided a form of deposit
insurance to one another and helped a large swath of the financial sector withstand banking panics.6 Professor Paolo
Saguato examines a different, modern version of clearinghouses: entities that facilitate the clearing and settlements of
trillions of dollars of securities and derivatives trades each
day.7 Modern clearinghouses, or clearing companies, reduce
risk to parties to these transactions and to the entire financial
system by serving as central counterparties to trades.8 Professor Saguato argues that the demutualization of clearinghouses
results in their shareholders having incentives to increase the
risk profile of these entities at the expense of both members
(i.e., the financial institutions using the company to clear and
settle trades) and the entire financial system.9 He proposes
various mechanisms to give control of clearing company risktaking back to the members/users, who have the ultimate risk
exposure.10
Still other scholars examine the way in which credit unions
and other financial cooperatives tend to offer loans and other
financial products with more favorable and less exploitative
terms to borrowers and consumers.11 Older works by Professor Henry Hansmann and others demonstrate that mutually
owned banks and other lenders tend to make less risky invest4
See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as a Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 419–20 (2011).
5
See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367,
403–07 (2002) (tracing legislative and regulatory history of stock exchange
demutualization in the United States).
6
Gary Gorton, Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the
United States, 45 J. ECON. HIST. 277, 282–83 (1985).
7
Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game”
Is Not Enough, the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 601, 601
(2017).
8
Id. at 601, 603–05.
9
Id. at 642–46.
10
Id. at 659–65.
11
See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual Ownership, 105 J. PUB. ECON. 39, 46 (2013) (finding that credit unions have lower
purchase and default annual percentage rates and lower late and over-the-limit
fees than investor-owned issuers).
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ments and run a lower risk of failure.12 In life insurance, mutual companies tend to have much more conservative financial
reserve practices than their investor-owned counterparts.13
Common threads unite these different strands of scholarship. Each of these scholars argues that the organizational
form that a financial institution takes matters intensively for
one or more of the following policy concerns: the institution’s
risk-taking; the risk of financial failure; and consumer protection. Each of these strands of scholarship examines how an
organizational form other than the investor-owned corporation
may further one or more of these policy objectives. An alternative entity form may lower the risk that a financial institution
would: fail and thus impose costs on investors, customers, or
the financial system;14 break laws or commit misconduct;15 or
exploit customers or consumers.16
Alternative entities—partnerships,17 mutuals,18 and cooperatives19—offer one or more of these policy advantages over
the investor-owned corporation by changing the basic relationship between a firm’s owners and its management. Some of the
aforementioned scholarship focuses on changes in control
rights or liability rules with respect to the entity. For example,
12
See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 249–50, 255–57
(2000).
13
See id. at 267–70.
14
By lowering the risk that a financial institution will fail, an alternative
entity form may also mitigate systemic risk, i.e., lower the incidence and severity
of financial crises; the failure of financial institution triggering the failure of other
institutions represents one channel for systemic risk to propagate. George G.
Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What Is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators
Retard or Contribute to It?, 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 372–73 (2003) (describing how
systemic risk may arise from chain reaction of financial institution failures). However, even financial firms organized as partnerships or mutuals may not consider
the full systemic risk implications of their failure in their decisions to take risks as
some of the costs of their failure are externalized on other firms or the entire
financial system.
15
See, e.g., Andrew Park, The Endless Cycle of Corporate Crime and Why It’s
So Hard to Stop, DUKE LAW NEWS (Jan. 13, 2017), https://law.duke.edu/news/
endless-cycle-corporate-crime-and-why-its-so-hard-stop/ [https://perma.cc/
T88V-YZNK] (“In scandal after scandal . . . big corporations or their employees are
found to be flouting laws, often at the expense of consumers or investors.”).
16
See, e.g., Luke Landes, Mutual Vs. Public Insurance Companies, CONSUMERISM COMMENTARY (July 31, 2019), https://www.consumerismcommentary.com/
mutual-vs-public-insurance-companies/ [https://perma.cc/37FB-ZCWG] (last
updated July 31, 2018).
17
Partnership, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A voluntary association of two or more persons who jointly own and carry on a business for profit.”).
18
Mutual Company, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A company that
is owned by its customers rather than by a separate group of stockholders.”).
19
Cooperative, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An organization or
enterprise (as a store) owned by those who use its services.”).
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Professors Hill and Painter write on the benefits that come with
an investment bank partnership: personal liability chastens
the risk-taking of partners and gives them the incentive and
tools to monitor and exercise control over the actions of their
co-owners.20 However, the benefits of alternative entity forms
flow from more than just the rules surrounding liability and
control rights. After all, in many modern partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives, control is delegated to a small cadre of
managers21 and the personal liability of owners in many forms
such as mutuals remains limited.22 Alternative entity forms
exert a profound and often socially beneficial influence on the
behavior of these managers by changing the identity of the
residual claimant of the firm.23 Even if a firm’s residual claimant—–the economic actor or actors entitled to the firm’s net
cash flows after all debts and other claims have been paid24—
has weak levers to control management, management has no
other claimants to whom it is ultimately beholden. This can
dramatically reorient management’s incentives and refashion
its culture. Management in an investor-owned corporation
faces strong pressures to serve profit-seeking shareholders
with potentially no other ties to the firm.25 Management of a
corporation may follow the norm of shareholder wealth maximization.26 By contrast, management of partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives are ultimately responsible to altogether
different constituents: employees or producers (as is the case
with investment banking partnerships) or consumers (as with
mutual or cooperative banks and insurance companies).27
20

See infra section I.A.
For example, Professors Hill and Painter highlight the role that executive
committees played in governing the old investment banking partnerships. HILL &
PAINTER, supra note 3, at 101.
22
For example, state statutes typically limit the liability of policyholders in a
mutual insurance company to payment of premiums specified in the policy. E.g.,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-218 (2019).
23
See Oliver E. Williamson, Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 351, 356–60 (1983).
24
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302–03 (1983).
25
Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful
Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 9–13 (2010).
26
Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and its Implementation Under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389 (2014).
27
This explanation tracks Henry Hansmann’s work, which sees the identity
of the residual claimant as central to the behavior of alternative entities such as
mutuals and cooperatives. Hansmann explains the importance of the identity of
the residual claimants compared to control rights in the following passage:
21

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN305.txt

2020]

unknown

REMUTUALIZATION

Seq: 7

28-JUL-20

17:16

803

The organizational form, and particularly alternatives to
investor-owned corporations, represents a potentially powerful
but forgotten tool in the regulatory arsenal. Redefining who
bears liability for a firm’s debts in the case of its insolvency,
who the firm’s residual claimant is, and who exercises control
and how that control is exercised, can profoundly alter a firm’s
risk-taking and treatment of consumers.28 Moreover, the organizational form as a regulatory tool offers advantages over existing financial regulation. It engages firm owners, and not just
government regulators, in policing risk-taking, market conduct, and legal compliance.29 It also offers governance mechanisms that are more time-tested than many recent novel
proposals that seek to expand the fiduciary duties of directors
and officers, whether in terms of the duties owed, which persons owe the duties, and to whom those duties run.30
Deploying the set of tools offered by remutualization requires careful consideration not only of the benefits but also of
the costs. Chief among those costs are the difficulties that
alternative entity forms would face in raising large amounts of
capital and expanding the scope and complexity of their operations.31 However, this might prove to be a virtue. Investment
banks reverting to partnership form or large lenders or insurance companies remutualizing would create checks on the size
and complexity of these financial institutions. The organizational form would serve as an alternative to breaking up large
financial institutions to address “Too-Big-To-Fail” and related
concerns.32 In this sense, remutualization bears a strong resemblance to Professor Stout’s proposal on derivatives, as re-

[B]y virtue of their ownership, the patrons are assured that there is
no other group of owners to whom management is responsive. It is
one thing to transact with a firm whose firm whose managers are
nominally your agents but are not much subject to your control; it is
another to transact with a firm whose managers are actively serving
owners who have an interest clearly adverse to yours.
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 48.
28
See id. at 255–56, 269–70.
29
See infra section IV.C.
30
For a review and critique of corporate governance proposals to address
systemic risk, particularly proposals involving modifying fiduciary duties of bank
directors and officers, see Robert C. Hockett, Are Bank Fiduciaries Special?, 68
ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1107–10 (2017).
31
See infra section IV.A.3; HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 273–74.
32
For a primer on the “Too-Big-To-Fail” problem and an argument that the
Dodd-Frank Act did not solve it, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act:
A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV.
951 (2011).
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quiring an “insurable interest” would curb the volume of
derivatives.33
At the same time and by contrast, mutuals may face conflicts among residual claimants when a firm offers very different financial products.34 Mutual companies work best for their
owners, when those owners have homogenous interests. Homogeneity reduces conflict among residual claimants.35 The
potential comparative advantages of an investor-owned corporation, however, must be weighed against its costs both to customers and financial markets as described in this Article.
There are also overarching risks of financial institutions conglomerating and offering products and services across multiple
financial sectors.36
Some scholars have described the agency costs faced by
owners of partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives who have
limited effective ability to control management. However,
mutuals, cooperatives, and partnerships address agency costs
in a subtler way beyond control rights. As explained below,
changing the identity of the residual claimant of the firm ensures that management will not prioritize the interests of any
other claimant above the owners, particularly those of profitseeking investors.37 Moreover, evidence from the insurance
industry suggests the agency cost concerns associated with
mutuals are muted; in many studies, mutual firms do not suffer from worse financial performance or charge higher prices
than their investor-owned counterparts.38
Professor Hansmann provides a valuable framework for
thinking about which stakeholders should optimally own a firm
and toward what form of ownership firms in any given industry
tend to gravitate. Financial firms, like any other firm, have
33
After the global financial crisis, Professor Stout revisited her Duke Law
Journal article and argued that her earlier policy proposals would reduce both the
size of the mushrooming derivatives market and systemic risk. See, e.g., Lynn A.
Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them, REGULATION, Fall 2009, at
30, 33 (suggesting a return to “common-law rule against difference contracts” to
counteract “speculation [that] drives the OTC [(“over the counter”)] derivative markets” and increases systemic risk). In this Article, Professor Stout cited a startling
statistic: at the end of 2008, when the financial crisis was peaking, the notional
value of all credit default swaps, a derivative used to hedge the credit risk of bonds
was $67 trillion, while “the total market value of all the underlying bonds issued
by U.S. companies outstanding was only $15 trillion.” Id.
34
See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 263, 283–84 (stressing the “importance of
homogeneity of interest among the members of a mutual company”).
35
Id.
36
See infra notes 184–87 and accompanying text.
37
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 48.
38
See infra notes 148–65 and accompanying text.

R
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multiple “patrons,” including employees/producers, capital
providers, customers, suppliers, purchasers, and other
counterparties. A firm could be owned by any one of these
types of patrons. Owners might be:
•
•

•
•

investors whose primary role is to supply capital and
whose main interest in the firm are investment returns;
employees or producers (as is the case with investment
banks in the past and law firm partnerships up to the
current day);
customers (for example, in mutual banks or insurance
companies); or
counterparties in an industry (as with members of the old
banking or modern securities/derivative clearinghouse).39

In Professor Hansmann’s framework, any choice of entity
has two sets of costs associated with it:
Market contracting costs: the costs of patrons who do not
have ownership rights over the firm who must contract with
the firm in the marketplace; and
The ownership costs of the patrons that do have those
rights.40

This framework comes straight from the established “theory of
the firm” literature.41 Professor Hansmann theorizes that the
optimal form of entity is one that minimizes the sum of market
contracting and ownership costs.42 Over time, firms in an industry may gravitate towards the optimal form, e.g., toward
investor- or mutually owned firms.
This Article explores whether modern investment banks,
commercial banks, insurance companies, and firms within a
financial industry sector as a collective impose too high market-contracting costs on a wide set of patrons of the firm. To
the extent that customers, consumers, and counterparties of
firms in a particular financial services sector cannot adequately protect their interests via contract—whether due to
asymmetric information with respect to the products and services being offered, behavioral biases, or market structures—
39

See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 46–49.
See id. at 48 (discussing both costs of market contracting and costs of
ownership).
41
Id. at 19–20.
42
Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 273
(1988) (“Efficiency will be best served if ownership is assigned [s]o that total
transaction costs for all patrons are minimized. This means minimizing the sum
of both the costs of market contracting for those patrons who are not owners, and
the costs of ownership for the class of patrons who are assigned ownership.”
(footnote omitted)).
40

R
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some version of partnership, mutual, or cooperative may become increasingly attractive in terms of net social benefits.43
Furthermore, when the behavior—and notably the insolvency—of a particular type of financial firm imposes significant
spillover costs on financial markets, market participants cannot protect themselves through contract or investment diversification. In this situation, systemic risk manifests.44 One of
these alternative forms may then become even more attractive
as a means to mitigate this risk. A partnership, mutual, or
cooperative might reduce firm size or internalize spillover costs,
in either case reducing the risk profile of the firm vis-à-vis
financial markets. In these scenarios, higher market contracting costs might outweigh any costs associated with ownership of these alternative organizational forms. Note that while
an alternative organizational form might address systemic risk,
it can never do so to perfection. Absent regulation or external
constraints, no financial firm has incentive to completely internalize all the costs of its failure. The analysis in this Article is
instead comparative: what net social benefits or costs does an
alternative organizational form for a financial company have
relative to an investor-owned counterpart?
Returning to many of these alternative organizational
forms—the partnerships, mutuals, cooperatives, or clearinghouses—would rethink and reverse the wave of demutualization that swept through the financial services sector from the
1970s to the early 2000s. This wave resulted in financial services firms converting to investor-owned corporations and conducting initial public offerings (IPOs).45 Over this period, large
43

HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 21–22.
Kaufman & Scott, supra note 14, at 371–74.
45
In addition to investment banks and mutual insurance companies, other
types of financial intermediaries with similar organizational structures also chose
to transform into publicly traded corporations. For some of the literature on the
demutualization of stock exchanges, see Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and
Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 105, 107–10
(2002); Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as
Usual?, 21 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 657, 667–73 (2001); Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock
Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2575–85 (2006); Karmel,
supra note 5 at 409–13.
In the 2000s, the Mastercard and Visa payment card networks transformed
from entities owned by card-issuing banks into corporations and conducted initial
public offerings. Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO: Protecting the Priceless
Brand, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 144–45 (2007); Eric Dash, Big Payday for
Wall St. in Visa’s Public Offering, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2008), https://www.ny
times.com/2008/03/19/business/19visa.html [https://perma.cc/2CBL-A64E]
(describing largest IPO in U.S. history to that date). Scholars have analyzed how
incorporation and IPOs responded to antitrust litigation against the networks.
See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Updating Our Understanding of the Role of Lawyers:
44
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investment banks abandoned the partnership form.46 The end
of the twentieth century saw a wave of demutualization among
large life insurance companies.47 Both types of firms, investment banks and insurance companies, became publicly traded
corporations in an effort to raise capital, expand the scope of
their operations into new financial markets, and compete globally.48 These different categories of financial institutions also
sought to compete with one another across financial services
sectors, when both regulators, and Congress lowered the
Glass-Steagall-era legal walls separating the businesses of
banking, securities, and insurance.49 Looking backwards, this
wave of demutualization followed a much earlier transformation in the twentieth century in which mutually owned banks
and savings and loan associations lost ground to their investorowned, corporate competitors.50 Note that the transformational shift toward investor-owned corporations continues into
the current day albeit with a twist: prominent asset management firms have previously conducted IPOs and only recently
began converting from partnerships to corporations.51 At the
Lessons from MasterCard, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 175, 179–84 (2007) (noting
that the IPO was a way for MasterCard to compete with Visa); Joshua D. Wright,
MasterCard’s Single Entity Strategy, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 225, 229 (2007)
(suggesting that MasterCard’s single entity strategy could shield it from liability
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
The benefits and costs of demutualization and remutualization in the stock
exchange and payment network contexts are worth exploring but are beyond the
scope of this Article.
46
See infra section I.A.
47
See infra section I.C.
48
See infra sections I.A and I.C.
49
For a history of the end of Glass-Steagall, see ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.,
TAMING THE MEGABANKS—WHY WE NEED A NEW GLASS-STEAGALL ACT ch. 7–8 (forthcoming 2020), and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to Repeal of the GlassSteagall Act, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 441, 492–503 (2017)
[hereinafter Wilmarth, Road to Repeal]. For a germinal analysis of how the demise
of Glass-Steagall fostered the creation of financial conglomerates that spanned
banking, securities, and insurance business lines, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of
the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 972–79 (2009) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 219–20.
50
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 254–58.
51
Michael J. de la Merced, Blackstone Will Ditch Partnership Structure to
Draw More Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/18/business/dealbook/blackstone-corporate-structure.html [https://
perma.cc/58DR-MMM9] (“The Blackstone Group said on Thursday that it
planned to convert itself into a standard corporation, becoming the latest investment firm to abandon its partnership structure . . . .”); Heather Perlberg, Carlyle
Plans to Announce Conversion to C-Corp With Earnings, BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-09/carlyle-plans-to-an-
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same time, U.S. law firms and other legal service companies
have recently again flirted with the idea of following several
U.K. law firms and conducting an IPO.52 The changes that
came when previous financial sector firms converted to the
corporate form, including enhanced risk-taking and refocusing
from the interests of clients and customers to those of shareholders, may now reach new sectors of the financial services
industry. This makes revisiting the consequences of earlier
demutualizations of financial institutions all the more
pressing.
Many factors explain demutualization and the rise of investor-owned financial firms at the expense of mutuals. The increasing effectiveness of financial regulation represents
perhaps the most surprising factor.53 Professor Hansmann argues that the shift in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century away from mutual banks and toward investor-owned
corporate banks stemmed from the fact that more effective
bank regulation convinced depositors increasingly to deposit
their savings with the corporate banks they previously distrusted as too unstable.54 Similarly, effective state insurance
regulation gave assurances to life insurance policy holders that
they could trust corporate insurers and not just mutuals.55
However, now, the global financial crisis has called into question the continuing effectiveness of banking and other regulations. The failure of financial institution regulation calls for a
reckoning of the costs of decades of demutualization. This failure also creates an opening for reconsidering and reviving the
use of partnerships, cooperatives, and mutually owned entities
in financial services.56
Prosecutors and agencies might require remutualization of
a firm that has committed severe misconduct as an alternative
to shuttering the firm or imposing fines. Policymakers can pronounce-conversion-to-c-corp-with-earnings [https://perma.cc/G2F4-HAB3]
(“The Washington-based firm would be the last of the private-equity giants to
switch from a partnership to a corporation . . . .”).
52
Roy Strom, Why U.S. Legal Businesses Flirt with IPOs But Don’t Commit,
BLOOMBERGLAW (Sept. 12, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/
why-u-s-legal-businesses-flirt-with-ipos-but-dont-commit [https://perma.cc/
D8J4-2DEV].
53
See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 255–56.
54
See id. at 255.
55
See id. (explaining how these regulations “gave depositors some assurance
that investor-owned banks would not speculate excessively with the funds entrusted to them. This form of regulation was evidently sufficiently effective to
deprive the mutual banks of their decisive competitive advantage over investorowned banks”).
56
See infra Part IV.
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mote remutualization by providing preferences in financial regulation. These preferences could lighten regulatory
requirements in areas in which partnerships or the mutual
form provide partial policy solutions. For example, if investment bank partnerships or mutually owned banks have incentives to make less risky investments and thus pose a lower risk
of insolvency, then policymakers should require less regulatory
capital or charge lower premia for deposit insurance.57 Historically, policymakers granted these sorts of regulatory preferences to some mutually owned entities.58 Legally, they may be
required to do so under certain statutory regimes.59 Policymakers could also foster remutualization by restoring and expanding the tax preferences that were historically given to
certain mutual firms.60
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I takes stock of the
history of demutualization across different categories of financial institutions. It sketches out the social cost of financial
institutions abandoning the partnership or mutual form and
reviews legal scholarship that proposes reversion to the earlier
organizational forms. Part II shifts from the organizational
form of individual firms to examine proposals for mutualizing
risk, particularly systemic risk, across the industry. Part III
discusses policy instruments that could promote remutualization. Part IV outlines the benefits and costs of using these
policy instruments, including the costs of the alternative organizational forms compared to the investor-owned corporation.
I
DEMUTUALIZATION AND REMUTUALIZATION ACROSS
FINANCIAL SECTORS
The introduction to this Article sketched a broad phenomenon of financial institutions “demutualizing,” with successive
waves of demutualization gathering strength in the last four
57
See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 257 (“If the government had responded by
charging lower premiums on deposit insurance to mutual banks than to investorowned banks, the mutual banks might still have been able to translate their
advantages as fiduciaries into a competitive advantage vis-à-vis investor-owned
banks.”).
58
Id. at 257–58.
59
For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991 required that a federal agency change to a “risk-based” assessment approach for charging premia for its deposit insurance. Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat.
2236 (Dec. 19, 1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)).
60
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 275–76 (describing tax incentives for life insurance mutuals).
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decades.61 However, analyzing the reasons for, and social
costs of, different financial institutions abandoning the partnership or mutual form requires close attention to institutional
detail and to differences among types of institutions. To begin
with, the partnerships, mutually owned companies, and cooperatives bear strong resemblance to one another but are different types of legal entities. The entity forms differ in terms of the
economic agents that (1) possess the residual claims on the
firm’s cash flows; (2) exercise control; and (3) bear the firm’s
liabilities. The following chart highlights some of the key differences among the legal features of partnerships, the archetypal
mutually owned financial institution, and the typical investorowned stock corporation.

61

Aggarwal, supra note 45, at 105.
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PARTNERSHIPS, MUTUALLY OWNED COMPANIES, AND INVESTOROWNED CORPORATIONS COMPARED
Organizational Form
Feature
Partnership
Typical Mutually
Investor-Owned
Corporation
Owned Financial
Institution
Members of the
Shareholders.64
Who is the
Partners.62
firm’s
mutual (e.g.,
residual
depositors for a
claimant?
mutual bank;
(equity
policyholders for a
owner)
mutual insurance
company).63
Who
Partners (or
Directors (members Directors have
exercises
subset of
exercise little
day-to-day
practical control).66 control;67
effective
partners, e.g.,
control over management
Shareholders elect
the firm?
committee).65
directors and have
voting rights on
certain matters.68
Limited liability
What is the Each partner is
Limited liability
liability of
shield for
jointly and several shield for
the residual liable for liabilities members.70
shareholders
claimant for of general
(shareholders
the
generally not liable
partnership; No
obligations
for more than
limited liability
of the firm? shield for partners
value of their
stock).71
in a general
partnership.69

62
The status of partners as residual claimant of the partnership can be seen
most clearly in the dissolution provisions of state partnership statutes. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VI § 15-807(a) (2018) (codifying partners’ liabilities to one
another in cases of dissolution, settlement, and contribution).
63
See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 247 (mutual savings banks), 252 (mutual
savings and loan associations), 269–70 (mutual insurance companies).
64
See generally Kimble C. Cannon & Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority Shareholder Rights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual
Claimants and Maximizing Long-term Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 725 (discussing rights of shareholders as residual
claimants).
65
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VI §§ 15-401(f), 407 (2018).
66
See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 247, 252, 269–70.
67
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII § 141(a) (2018).
68
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII § 141(d), (k) (2018).
69
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VI § 15-306(a) (2018).
70
See, e.g., James R. Garven, An Exposition of the Implications of Limited
Liability and Asymmetric Taxes for Property-Liability Insurance, 59 J. RISK & INSURANCE 34, 48–49 (1992) (examining effects of limited liability on mutual property
insurers).
71
For the classic empirical study of the principal exception to the limited
liability enjoyed by shareholders of corporations, see Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil; An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991).
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In addition, different categories of financial institutions
have different business models, perform different economic
functions, are governed by different legal regimes, suffer different kinds of market failures, and thus raise different policy
concerns. All of this, as explained below, translates into
demutualization causing different but broadly similar policy
consequences depending on the type of financial institution.
On the other hand, remutualization and the use of organizational form—whether partnership, mutual, or collective—as
regulatory instrument will also yield different but broadly similar policy results for investment banks versus banks and other
lenders versus insurance companies.
It is therefore important to dive into the institutional and
historical detail of investment bank partnerships, mutual
banks, and mutual insurance companies; the dynamics that
pushed firms in these three industries to demutualize or shift
toward the investor-owned corporation; and the consequences
of these shifts.
A. Investment Banks
1. The Demise of Investment Banks as Partnerships
Before 1970, U.S. stock exchange rules prevented publicly
held corporations from being exchange members. Accordingly,
investment banks, which held seats on the New York Stock
Exchange or other exchanges and were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as broker-dealers,
were organized as partnerships.72 The partners of each of
these investment banks thus had joint and several liability for
the debts of the firm. As Professors Hill and Painter have described, this created a very financially conservative ethos at
these securities firms.73 Partners developed internal governance mechanisms and cultures to police each other’s risk-taking and to vet individuals carefully before admitting them as
partners of the firm. Many investment bankers believed that
the partnership form sent a signal of the firm’s prudence to
their customers.74
The world began to experience a seismic shift in 1970 when
Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette challenged the stock exchange rules and embarked on a course to convert into a publicly traded corporation.75 The SEC acquiesced. Over the next
72
73
74
75

HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 78.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 95–107.
Id. at 78–79.
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three decades, other major investment banks abandoned the
partnership form and became publicly traded corporations, as
indicated by the following timeline of IPOs:
1970: Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette
1971: Merrill Lynch
1984: Lehman Brothers (via acquisition by Shearson/American Express, which was publicly listed)
1985: Bear Stearns
1985: Morgan Stanley
1999: Goldman Sachs76

A number of factors drove investment banks to abandon
the partnership form, become corporations, and pursue IPOs.
The business of investment banking changed radically in the
1970s and 1980s. For one, a sharp rise in securities trading
volume in the 1960s created the so-called “back-office crisis” of
1967–1970, in which investment banks struggled with paper
processing of trades.77 Investment banks needed capital for
technology investments to process trades and keep up with
competitors, such as Merrill Lynch, that had successfully computerized back-office operations.78 Thus, as the 1960s and
1970s progressed, institutional investors came to value personal relationships with, and personalized investment advice
from, investment bankers less.79 They had in-house personnel
who could conduct investment analysis and make investment
decisions.
Further, other regulatory changes eroded other centers of
profit for investment banks. In 1975, Congress mandated that
the SEC change its rules to end fixed-brokerage commissions.80 Afterwards, investment banks/brokers had to negotiate rates with customers, which eroded a steady stream of
profits. At the same time, brokers required huge amounts of
capital to make technology investments to service the needs of
76
ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 237 (2007) [hereinafter MORRISON & WILHELM, INVESTMENT
BANKING]; Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., The Demise of the Investment Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence, 63 J. FIN. 311, 327 (2008)
[hereinafter MORRISON & WILHELM, The Demise of Investment Banking

Partnerships].
77
HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 88.
78
MORRISON & WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 76, at 235–38, 278.
79
Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Trust, Reputation and Law: The
Evolution of Commitment in Investment Banking, 7 J. LEGAL. ANALYSIS 363, 394–97
(2015) [hereinafter Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law].
80
HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 80.
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institutional investors.81 These investors had assumed a dominant share of stock market investing and wanted speedy execution of trades, better execution, and lower commissions.82
And in 1982, the SEC allowed large issuers to conduct “shelf
registrations” of securities.83 Issuers could thus perform much
of the legal and financial preparation for a securities issuance
in-house. When they wanted to make an issuance of securities
(taking securities “off the shelf”), issuers could then ask a number of underwriters to make competitive bids.84 This lessened
the dependence of issuers on longstanding relationships with a
particular investment banking firm and placed downward pressure on investment banking commissions. Faced with declining margins in their traditional brokerage and underwriting
businesses, many investment banks turned to new business
lines, such as proprietary trading, which required more capital
investments and involved much more risk.85
The old partnership structures served to bind partners to
the firm and to dampen partner risk-taking.86 In a world in
which client relationships mattered less and new riskier lines
of business were prized, these structures and strictures became less important and a source of perceived competitive disadvantage. A new national emphasis on meritocracy placed
further stress on the clubby world of investment bank partnerships.87 The social connections of and among partners mattered less.88 At the same time, investment banker norms about
putting client and customer interests first also eroded as bankers sought more profitable lines of business.89
Investment banks faced new competition and new opportunities for expansion as financial services became increasingly
globalized.90 Moreover, the erosion of Glass-Steagall rules separating the commercial banking, investment banking/securi81

See id. at 73, 87–89.
Id. at 73, 78–80.
83
Id. at 81.
84
Id. at 82.
85
Id. at 73–74, 81–83; see Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law,
supra note 79, at 394–97; see also Alan D. Morrison et al., Investment-Banking
Relationships: 1933–2007, at 35 (Saı̈d Business School Working Paper No. 20141), https://web.northeastern.edu/kkrishnan/Wilhelm_paper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XR7L-ZUXU] (documenting declining interest among securities issuers
in long-term relationships with investment banks).
86
HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 96–97.
87
Id. at 89; Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, supra note 79,
at 397.
88
HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 72, 89–90.
89
Id. at 100–05.
90
Id. at 72.
82
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ties, and insurance meant new competitors for investment
banks.91 Depository banks and insurance companies entered
lines of the securities business traditionally reserved for investment banks.92 The investment banking industry sued the regulators of commercial banks in unsuccessful attempts to block
these new entrants into the securities business.93
Alan Morrison and William Wilhelm describe the tipping
point in an investment bank’s calculus of whether to switch
from partnership to publicly traded corporation when new
technologies generated sufficient economies of scale to the investment banking business that individual partners no longer
had incentives to mentor junior colleagues.94 Economies of
scale at some point dwarfed any reputational loss to a firm
from declining mentorship and monitoring of junior employees.
Meanwhile, the advent of personal computing together with the
rise of financial engineering and quantitative approaches to
investing meant that investment banks needed more capital for
technology.95 At the same time, these dynamics also diminished the importance of tacit knowledge and relationships.
Morrison and Wilhelm argue that the order in which investment banks went public illustrates these forces at work. The
first firms to abandon the partnership form and conduct IPOs
were firms active in securities markets, while the last partnership holdouts were firms like Goldman Sachs that relied on
advisory businesses.96
The Goldman IPO marked the end of a contentious fight
among old and new guard partners at that firm about the firm’s
culture, the reputational value for clients of Goldman being
organized as a partnership, and the risk-taking and business
model of the firm. After the IPO, the investment bank moved
toward businesses such as proprietary trading that were less
client-centered compared to traditional business lines (such as
securities underwriting) and involved a higher degree of risk to
the firm and its customers. The Goldman IPO also marked the
91

Id. at 84–85.
Id.; MORRISON & WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 76, at 281–84,
296–300.
93
See, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1113 (1990) (suing the Comptroller of the Currency); Sec.
Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1059 (1988) (suing the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
94
MORRISON & WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 76, at 276–77.
95
Id. at 279–80.
96
Id. at 276–280; Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, supra
note 79, at 392–94, Morrison & Wilhelm, The Demise of Investment Banking
Partnerships, supra note 76, at 314–15.
92
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end of the era of major U.S. investment banks being organized
as private partnerships.97
IPOs gave partners of investment banks enormous
payouts.98 IPOs also gave investment banks new tools for compensation.99 They could now pay traders and other employees
with stock options and restricted stock.100 These forms of compensation dramatically altered the incentives of employees to
take risks.101 This change in investment banker pay mirrored
a large movement among American corporations to use compensation to make management more responsive to shareholders and to promote shareholder value as an overarching
goal.102 Investment bank employees received a hidden boost to
compensation compared to the old partnerships because personal liability was jettisoned.103 A lack of joint and several
liability also meant bankers needed to take less care in vetting
new colleagues.104
IPOs also left investment banking firms flush with cash,
which they used for acquisition sprees.105 The investment
banking and brokerage industry underwent rapid and massive
consolidation. Capital also allowed investment banks to
purchase other kinds of financial firms and enter other businesses as regulators lowered the Glass-Steagall-era walls separating the securities business from that of banking and
insurance.106
2. Consequences
Professors Hill and Painter explain how this shift away
from partnerships transformed Wall Street firms and the entire
97
See STEVEN G. MANDIS, WHAT HAPPENED TO GOLDMAN SACHS: AN INSIDER’S
STORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DRIFT AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 95 (2013).
98
See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 112.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 105–07.
101
Id. at 119.
102
Id. at 105–06.
103
Hill and Painter illustrate the effects on limited liability on compensation
with an anecdote from an old investment banking partnership. They discuss the
time when an individual was named partner at the old Salomon Brothers firm, a
senior partner cautioned him to tell his spouse “that once you sign the partnership papers next week you will be personally liable for $2 billion.” HILL & PAINTER,
supra note 3, at 97 (citing Henry Kaufman, Henry Kaufman on Civility in the
Financial Sector, CARNEGIE COUNCIL (June 20, 2011), https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20110620-henry-kaufman-on-civility-in-the-financial-sector [https://perma.cc/DWN6-ZDAY].
104
HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 95.
105
Id. at 73–74, 78–79.
106
Id. at 84–85.
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industry.107 They link the loss of joint and several liability at
investment banks to a greater appetite for risk-taking and
transactions that compromised client interests and bent financial laws and regulation.108 Removing personal liability triggered or reinforced shifts in the culture of investment banks
that prioritized profit and risk.109 Professors Hill and Painter
trace how lower individual liability and organizational dynamics led to a series of calamitous investment bank actions in the
years preceding, during, and after the global financial crisis.
These actions include the following:
•

Creating extremely risky asset-backed securities and
other financial instruments, selling them to customers,
and hiding the risks;110
• Concealing investment banks’ own risks from their creditors and investors and from regulators;111
• Helping clients conceal leverage and risk from
governments;112
• Manipulating financial markets and indices such as
LIBOR;113 and
• Evading laws and regulations, including doing business
with sanctioned countries and assisting clients in evading
taxes.114

The demise of the investment bank partnership increased
individual banker mobility, weakening loyalty to individual
firms.115 At the same time that investment banks became partnerships, scholars argue, investment bankers became less
concerned with firm reputation.116 Meanwhile, individual reputations assumed a greater importance as a “star culture” took
hold at many investment bank firms.117 The increasing com107
Id. at 79–80 (noting that removing personal liability incentivizes bankers to
take big risks because it is the shareholders, not the bankers, who own the banks’
capital and therefore have to absorb any losses).
108
Id. at 90.
109
Id. at 72.
110
Id. at 22–39.
111
Id. at 39–49; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
112
See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 54–57 (noting that Greece’s crosscurrency swap with Goldman Sachs—which relied on an invented exchange
rate—helped disguise Greece’s true financial condition).
113
Id. at 49–53. For analysis of the manipulation of LIBOR and other financial
benchmarks, see Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV.
1929 (2017); Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215
(2015).
114
Id. at 62–65.
115
MORRISON & WILHELM, INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 76, at 281–84.
116
See Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, supra note 79, at
390.
117
Id. at 367–68, 399.
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plexity of investment bank business further undermined mutual trust between banks and their clients.118 Some scholars
maintain that declining concern with investment bank firm
reputation contributed to the financial crisis.119
3. Policy Solutions
To remedy the incentives that skew in favor of excessive
risk taking, abuse of client trust, manipulation, and law-breaking, Professors Hill and Painter propose reintroducing personal
liability for senior investment banks.120 They formulate a “covenant banking” regime in which an investment bank would
voluntarily impose a set of contractual obligations on its highly
compensated bankers. This regime would subject bankers to
liability for at least a portion of the firm’s debts upon insolvency, as well as for regulatory fines and civil judgments.
B. Banks and Lenders
Banking experienced a transformation similar to that of
the investment banking industry, albeit one that occurred
much earlier. Mutual banks once enjoyed a dominant position
in American banking, but lost ground to investor-owned banks
for surprising reasons and with dramatic consequences.121
The history of mutually owned banks and banking cooperatives begins with mutual savings banks, the first of which was
founded in the United States in Massachusetts in 1816.122 By
1849, the United States had eighty-seven mutual savings
banks, primarily in the Northeastern and mid-Atlantic cities.
Distributed earnings for those banks were shared among depositors. However, depositors possessed no voting rights.
Control was exercised by a “self-perpetuating” board of directors. These mutual banks represented a valuable means for
working class individuals to deposit savings in an era in which
investor-owned banks, which raised funds primarily by issuing
118
Zhaohui Chen et al., Investment Bank Governance and Client Relationships 35–36 (Dec. 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3296347 [https://perma.cc/8KHE-68J9]).
119
Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, supra note 79, at 368
(citing Steven Davidoff Solomon, As Wall St. Firms Grow, Their Reputations Are
Dying, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 26, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/04/26/as-wall-st-firms-grow-their-reputations-are-dying [https://
perma.cc/A9PG-R82Y]).
120
HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 146.
121
See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 247–51, 254–56; MORRISON & WILHELM,
INVESTMENT BANKING, supra note 76, at 121, 146–49, 155–62.
122
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 246–48.
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stock rather than taking deposits, catered to merchants and
businesses.
In the nineteenth century, mutual savings banks thrived
and enjoyed a significant share of the market.123 According to
Professor Hansmann, bank regulation played a surprising role
in the ascendance of investor-owned banks taking the corporate form.124 Where deregulation ushered in the end of the
investment bank partnership, regulation catalyzed the rise of
corporate banks. Over the nineteenth century, individuals deposited their savings with mutual savings banks and not investor-owned banks because they did not trust the latter.125
Without effective bank regulation, managers of investor-owned
banks had incentives to invest in risky, speculative investments because of the asymmetry between those parties who
enjoyed a bank’s profits versus those parties who bore its risks.
When risky investments paid out, bank shareholders would
earn handsome profits while depositor returns would remain
fixed. By contrast, if investments failed, bankruptcy could
wipe out not only shareholders but also depositors. Managers
of investor-owned banks had an incentive to maintain only
minimal net assets at the bank. This increased leverage magnified potential returns, but left depositors dangerously exposed to losses. Depositors could not realistically contract with
management to protect themselves. The riskiness of investorowned banks in the nineteenth century is reflected in their high
rates of failure. For example, half of all investor-owned banks
formed between 1810 and 1820 had failed by 1825, and half of
all banks formed between 1830 and 1840 failed by 1845.
Unwilling to trust investor-owned banks with their savings,
depositors instead chose to deposit their savings with the mutual savings banks.126 Having depositors and customers as the
residual claimants on the firm’s profits rather than corporate
shareholders lowered the incentives of managers to make risky
loans or other investments. Even if members could not exercise significant control over management, the fact that members and no one else held the residual claims lessened the
pressure on managers to generate higher profits and thus to
take on more risk. This underscores a vital lesson for using the
organizational form as a regulatory tool: the identity of the
residual claimant affects the risk-taking of a financial institu123
124
125
126

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

246–49.
255.
247–49.
249–50.
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tion even when the mechanisms by which owners can effectively control management are weak.
Mutual banks represented just one organizational form
that competed with the investor-owned corporation. The landscape of American banking featured numerous other entities
with different residual claimants or controlling parties. Other
types of mutual and cooperative banking institutions emerged
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and provided other
options for individuals to deposit savings and even to borrow.
These institutions included the following:
Investor-owned trust companies developed in the nineteenth
century.127 Their compensation system for managers differed from that of investor-owned banks.128 Trust managers
were paid a percentage of total trust assets rather than profits, reducing their incentive to make risky investments and
increasing their incentive to attract long term deposits.
Mutual savings and loan associations (first called “mutual
building and loan associations”) in the United States arose in
the 1830s.129 These true cooperatives made consumer loans
at a time when investor-owned banks would not. Mutual
savings and loans could make these loans because their
tight-knit membership allowed them to screen borrowers.
These firms could thus solve two problems often associated
with lending: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse
selection occurs if a lender cannot differentiate between loan
applicants with low compared to high credit risk.130 As in a
classic “lemons” market, high credit risk borrowers may price
more credit-worthy borrowers out of the market as lenders
cannot distinguish the two groups and raise interest rates.
Moral hazard can arise when borrowers have incentive to use
loans once credit has been extended for risky projects and to
default should those projects fail.131
Credit unions entered the American financial services stage in
the early twentieth century.132 The chartering statutes for
credit unions required that these depositor cooperatives
maintain a “common bond,” such as employment at the same
place of work. Professor Hansmann argues that this com127

Id. at 248.
Id. at 252.
129
Id. at 252–53.
130
See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2075, 2129–30 (2016).
131
See Omarova, supra note 4, at 469 (citing HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER &
MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION 60–66 (2010)).
132
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 258–60.
128
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mon bond works to mitigate opportunistic behavior by borrowers in the same way that mutual ownership in savings
and loans addresses adverse selection and moral hazard. For
example, credit unions organized around places of employment may have greater information on the creditworthiness
of borrowers. Credit unions may also have additional mechanisms to secure repayment (via payroll deductions) and police borrower behavior (through social pressure of coworkers
and employer sanctions).

Mutual and cooperative banks not only make less risky
investment decisions, but data indicates that they also offer
more consumer-friendly terms to borrowers. For example,
Ryan Bubb and Alex Kaufman compared contractual terms in
loans offered by mutually owned lenders compared to those
offered by investor-owned firms.133 They found that loans by
mutually owned lenders imposed lower penalties on customers, such as lower penalty default interest rates. Professors
Bubb and Kaufman attribute this tendency to offer more consumer-friendly terms to the difference in the identity of the
residual claimant of mutually owned firms compared to investor-owned ones, as well as to the nonprofit status of these
lenders.134
These various kinds of mutual entities not only promoted
public policy goals, they also were extremely successful businesses. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mutual savings banks and mutual savings and loans enjoyed a
significant market share of deposit-taking and bank lending in
the United States. In 1880, mutual savings banks held 87% of
time deposits in the United States and mutual savings and loan
associations held an additional 1% share.135 At that same
point, investor-owned banks held only 12% of time deposits in
the country. The number of mutual and savings and loans
continued to grow until the early twentieth century, peaking at
12,600 firms in 1928. By contrast, credit unions continued to
grow throughout the twentieth century, with growth accelerating after the Second World War.136
1. Demutualization
The dominance of mutual savings banks and savings and
loans eroded throughout the twentieth century. In 1925, mu133
134
135
136

Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 11, at 39–40.
Id. at 40–42.
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 254.
Id. at 259.

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN305.txt

822

unknown

Seq: 26

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

28-JUL-20

17:16

[Vol. 105:797

tual savings banks held 32% and mutual savings and loan
institutions had 16% of U.S. deposits, while deposits in investor-owned banks climbed to 52%.137 Professor Hansmann
cites several factors as contributing to this shift, including
changes in the organizational structure of mutual banks and
savings and loans. For example, mutual savings and loans
began to enjoy a larger and more fluid set of members. This
reduced the ability of members to control the institutions they
owned. Looser communal bonds among members diluted an
important mechanism to counteract adverse selection and
moral hazard among borrowers.
However, regulation also played a role in the market shift
toward investor-owned corporations. This role can be seen first
when regulation was absent, in the reasons for the original
success of mutual banks.138 Professor Hansmann attributes
the success of mutually owned and cooperative banks and
lenders to a surprising dynamic. Professor Hansmann argues
that the introduction of successful bank prudential regulations
in the nineteenth century assured depositors and, in turn, investors, of the safety and soundness of corporate banks.139 At
that point, corporate banks then appeared to be a much safer
place to deposit money than before. This diminished the comparative advantage of banks organized as mutual or cooperatives. In short, prudential statutes and regulations began to
provide a substitute for the organizational form as a regulatory
tool.
As noted above, credit unions continued to thrive even as
mutual savings banks and mutual savings and loan associations declined in importance. However, the common bond requirement at the core of credit union regulation has been
incrementally relaxed. Credit unions no longer need a tight
common bond such as a common employer.140 Under 2018
rule changes adopted by the National Credit Union Administration, credit unions are no longer restricted to membership
under 2.5 million members; this has opened the door to “megacredit unions” whose membership and operation are national
in scope. Loosening the common bond not only allows for the
creation of giant credit unions, it also weakens the mechanisms described above for addressing opportunistic behavior
137

Id. at 254–55.
Id. at 247–51.
139
Id. at 255.
140
See Aaron D. Klein, Banklike Credit Unions Should Follow Bank Rules, AM.
BANKER (June 25, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/banklikecredit-unions-should-follow-bank-rules [https://perma.cc/KP6U-BS5G].
138
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by borrowers. This might, in turn, translate into less favorable
interest rates and terms for all the borrowers of credit unions.
2. Consequences of the Shift Away from Mutuals
The shift away from mutually owned and cooperative
banks toward investor-owned banks and savings and loans
translated into a decrease in the social benefits that came with
the mutual form, namely reduced firm risk-taking, more consumer-friendly loan terms, and greater access to banking services.141 The first consequence—greater risk-taking by
investor owned firms—can be seen by comparing the rate of
failures of mutually owned and cooperative banks and savings
and loans versus their investor-owned counterparts. Before
and during major financial crises, investor-owned banks and
savings and loans failed at significantly higher rates. This pattern held in the 1920s, during the Great Depression, and during the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s. Furthermore, the
shift to investor-owned lender can have costs in terms of consumer protection given the evidence that mutually owned and
cooperative lenders, such as credit unions, tend to offer more
consumer-friendly terms in loans and other financial products.
C. Insurance Companies
The mutual form has long enjoyed a significant share of
insurance markets, particularly in life insurance.142 Section
I.C.2 explains the structural advantages that mutuals enjoyed,
particularly those resulting from having policyholders and not
profit-oriented investors as the residual claimants of the firm.
Mutual insurance firms have persisted despite theories
from scholars that they would be plagued by agency costs.143
Scholars posited a “managerial discretion hypothesis” that
managers of a mutual insurer could behave opportunistically
vis-à-vis policyholders in risk selection and pricing of poli141

See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 246, 256–57.
Infra section I.C.1.
143
For an overview of these theories and a survey of research into mutual
insurance companies, see Antti Talonen, Systematic Literatures Review of Research on Mutual Insurance Companies, 4 J. CO-OPERATIVE ORG. & MGMT. 53
(2016); see also CNTR. FOR EXCELLENCE IN ACCOUNTING AND SECURITY ANALYSIS, COLUMBIA BUSINESS SCHOOL, ANALYSIS AND VALUATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, 7 (Nov.
2010), http://www.columbia.edu/~dn75/Analysis%20and%20Valuation
%20of%20Insurance%20Companies%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/G398JTC3] (explaining hypothesis that “mutuals should be less efficient than stocks
due to higher agency costs”).
142
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cies.144 However, there is little empirical support for opportunistic behavior by managers of mutual insurers.145 In fact,
studies indicate that stock insurers take on greater risk and
enter riskier business lines compared to mutual counterparts.146 This can result in mutuals having relatively lower
insolvency rates.147 Stock insurers do have higher executive
compensation148 and experience higher management turnover
in response to firm performance.149 Some academics believe
that the reduced risk of a corporate takeover allows mutuals to
maintain higher surpluses and thus to offer better insurance
against catastrophic risks.150 Other scholars have found that
mutual insurers maintain high surpluses151 and high degrees
of liquid assets.152
Scholars have also posited an “expense preference” hypothesis, which holds that weaker control mechanisms in mutual companies allow management to increase salaries and
144
See generally J. David Cummins, Mary A. Weiss & Hongmin Zi, Organizational Form and Efficiency: The Coexistence of Stock and Mutual Property-Liability
Insurers, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1254 (1999) [hereinafter Cummins et al., Organizational
Form and Efficiency] (articulating and testing different theories explaining the
organization form that insurance companies take); David Mayers & Clifford W.
Smith, Contractual Provisions, Organizational Structure, and Conflict Control in
Insurance Markets, 54 J. BUS. 407 (1981) (testing incentive problems when managers of insurance companies can exercise discretion).
145
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 269–72, 279, 285–86.
146
Joan Lamm-Tennant & Laura Starks, Stock Versus Mutual Ownership
Structures: The Risk Implications, 66 J. BUS. 29, 37–44 (1993) (finding stock insurers have significantly higher risk profiles compared to mutuals in property liability
insurance and underwrite more policies in riskier lines and markets); Christian
Laux & Alexander Muermann, Financing Risk Transfer Under Governance
Problems: Mutual Versus Stock Insurers, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 333, 348 (2010).
147
See also J. David Cummins, Scott E. Harrington & Robert Klein, Insolvency
Experience, Risk-Based Capital, and Prompt Corrective Action in Property-Liability
Insurance, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 511, 516, 522 (1995) (finding support for previous
studies showing mutual in property-liability insurance have lower insolvency
rates; mutual status improves accuracy of risk-based capital regulatory
formulae).
148
David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Executive Compensation in the Life
Insurance Industry, 65 J. BUS. 51, 68–73 (1992) [hereinafter Mayers & Smith,
Executive Compensation].
149
Enya He & David W. Sommer, CEO Turnover and Ownership Structure:
Evidence from the U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry, 78 J. RISK & INS. 673,
689–98 (2011).
150
Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 214 (1997).
151
Howard E. Winklevoss & Robert A. Zelten, An Empirical Analysis of Mutual
Life Insurance Company Surplus, 40 J. RISK & INS. 403, 421–25 (1973).
152
See generally Yung-Ming Shiu, Corporate Liquidity: Evidence from the
United Kingdom Life Insurance Industry, 13 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 111 (2006)
(testing when and which types of insurance companies hold more liquid assets).
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other costs.153 Although one cross-country comparative study
supports this hypothesis,154 multiple other studies failed to do
so.155 One study showed mutual insurance companies are not
less cost-efficient than their investor-owned stock counterparts.156 Again, mutuals have lower levels of executive compensation.157 Other studies show that an insurance
company’s expense levels do not fall after demutualization,158
and that expense levels do not appear to explain the decision to
demutualize.159 Historical studies of British insurers show
lower cost levels for mutual companies.160
Scholars note that mutuals use several strategies or have
certain features to address agency costs. For example, several
studies note that mutual boards have more outside directors
than their stock counterparts.161 As noted below, Professor
Hansmann argues that having policyholders as an insurer’s
residual claimant dampens agency costs as management has
no other constituency, such as investors, to whom it must
respond.162 Evidence shows mutuals offer lower priced policies
153
Cummins et al., Organizational Form and Efficiency, supra note 144, at
1255, 1268–69.
154
Id.
155
E.g., J. David Cummins, Maria Rubio-Misas & Hongmin Zi, The Effect of
Organizational Structure on Efficiency: Evidence from the Spanish Insurance Industry, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 3113, 3136–39, 3143–49 (2004) (finding evidence for
hypothesis only with respect to largest Spanish mutual).
156
Christian Biener & Martin Eling, Organization and Efficiency in the International Insurance Industry: A Cross-Frontier Analysis, 221 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES.
454, 460, 467 (2012).
157
Mayers & Smith, Executive Compensation, supra note 148.
158
Michael J. McNamara & S. Ghon Rhee, Ownership Structure and Performance: The Demutualization of Life Insurers, 59 J. RISK & INS. 221, 229, 236 (1992).
159
James M. Carson, Mark D. Forster & Michael J. McNamara, Changes in
Ownership Structure: Theory and Evidence from Life Insurer Demutualizations, 21
J. INS. ISSUES 1, 12–14 (1998).
160
See generally Christopher O’Brien & Paul Fenn, Mutual Life Insurers: Origins and Performance in Pre-1900 Britain, 54 BUS. HIST. 325 (2012) (explaining
evolution of mutual life insurance companies in Britain including their lower
costs compared to proprietary firms); Robin Pearson, Mutuality Tested: The Rise
and Fall of Mutual Fire Insurance Offices in Eighteenth-Century London, 44 BUS.
HIST. 1 (2002) (examining factors leading to rise of fire insurance companies
taking the mutual form).
161
David Mayers, Anil Shivdasani & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Board Composition
and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Insurance Industry, 70 J. BUS. 33,
34–35, 43–44, 56–57 (1997).
162
Infra section I.C.2. Hansmann’s arguments build off work by other scholars working in the theory of the firm literature. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Form and Investment Decisions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 101 (1985).
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compared to stock companies.163 This meshes with another
scholarly finding: a study shows U.K. mutual life insurers offer
higher payouts for policy holders, lower cost ratios, and higher
growth rates than stock counterparts.164
1. The Emergence and Dominance of Mutuals in Life
Insurance
In the mid-1990s, mutual insurance companies enjoyed a
share of approximately 50% of the life insurance market and
25% of the property and liability insurance market.165 At that
time, one life insurance mutual, Prudential, had assets exceeding those of any U.S. industrial corporation. Mutual life insurance companies first appeared in the United States in the
1840s. The first seven mutual companies formed in that decade remained in existence until the end of the twentieth century and were then counted among the largest mutuals. In
their first decades in existence, mutual life insurance companies largely drove investor-owned corporate life insurers out of
the market by writing the first long-term life insurance policies.
2. Life-Insurance Policyholder Protection: The Importance
of the Residual Claimant
Professor Hansmann attributes the business success of
mutual life insurance companies and their ability to offer these
longer term contracts to the mutual form itself.166 He explains
that long term life insurance policies create a large degree of
uncertainty for consumers who worry that insurance companies may not survive long enough to pay their future claims.
Policyholders may die sooner than expected, the actuarial forecasts on which insurers depend may miscalculate life expectancy, and an insurance company’s investments may not earn
sufficient returns to pay claims. As a result, the policyholder
may worry that the insurer may not retain adequate reserves to
cover its expected policy payouts. If shareholders are the
residual claimant of the insurance company, they may push
163
Alexander Braun, Hato Schmeiser & Przemyslaw Rymaszewski, Stock vs.
Mutual Insurers: Who Should and Who Does Charge More?, 242 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 875, 888 (2015).
164
See generally Seth Armitage & Peter Kirk, The Performance of Proprietary
Compared with Mutual Life Offices, 14 SERVICE INDUSTRIES J. 238 (1994) (comparing proprietary mutual life insurance companies and finding mutuals perform
better in average payouts on endowment policies, average cost ratios, and average
growth rates).
165
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 265–66.
166
See id. at 266–68.
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management to make riskier investments to earn greater returns. This runs contrary to the interest of policyholders for
conservative reserves.167
This under-reserving problem is addressed in the mutual
form because policyholders are the residual claimant. Even if
policyholders cannot realistically exercise control over management of the company, the fact that no other patron of the firm
is the residual claimant reduces incentives of management to
make risky investments and to under-reserve.168 Other researchers have found that mutuals enjoy a competitive advantage in life insurance and other insurance lines with long
horizon policies; longer time periods increase the risk of exploitation of policyholders by insurers.169 The mutual form
reduces the incentive to exploit policyholders who are also the
residual claimants. Many mutual insurance companies advertise their mutual status and lack of shareholders as making
them behave more in the interest of policyholders.170 This logic
emphasizing the importance of the residual claimant meshes
with the explanation of why mutual banks and credit unions
offer more consumer friendly terms to their customers.171
When customers are the residual claimant, the firm’s incentives to behave opportunistically are greatly reduced.
The status of policyholders as residual claimants explains
other ways in which mutual life insurers offer policy-holders
more consumer-friendly contracts. Professor Hansmann explains that life insurers face a particular adverse selection
problem with writing long term policies.172 A policyholder may
stop making payments later in the term of the policy when her
or his expected benefits under the policy no longer clearly exceed the premiums she or he must pay.173 Healthy policyholders are more likely to stop paying premia and drop their
policies, but less healthy customers who are more likely to
trigger policy payouts will remain in the insurance company’s
risk pool. Corporate life insurers often respond to this risk by
front-loading the premia that policyholders must pay. But
167
See id.; Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual Versus Stock, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125, 129–34 (1985) [hereinafter
Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies].
168
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 269–70; Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies, supra note 167, at 129–31.
169
HANSMANN, supra note 12; Cummins et al., Organizational Form and Efficiency, supra note 144, at 1255.
170
E.g., Landes, supra note 16.
171
Supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
172
See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 266–69.
173
Id. at 269.
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locking policyholders into longer term contracts has a perverse
consequence: policyholders are less likely to exit even when the
insurer is behaving opportunistically toward them. Front-loading premia addresses the adverse selection problem at the cost
of dulling a mechanism to discipline insurers. Mutuals, by
contrast, can mitigate the adverse selection problem in an altogether different way, namely by making the policyholder the
residual claimant and thus changing her or his incentives.174
Other theoretical and empirical research attributes the success
of mutual insurers to addressing adverse selection problems
among policyholders.175
The mutual form also helped life insurers manage an additional risk—inflation risk—with long term contracts and avoid
passing on this risk to policyholders in the form of higher
premia. Long term insurance contracts place tremendous
pressure on the business model of life insurers.176 If the average mortality rate, the real rate of return on investments, or the
rate of inflation differ from forecasts, the insurer can suffer
significant losses. The inflation rate poses particular problems.
If inflation rises over the term of the policy, the insurer wins
but the policyholder loses as higher price levels in the economy
reduce the real value of the payout. If inflation rises at a lower
than expected rate, the results reverse: the policyholder receives, and the insurer makes, a higher real payout. By placing
the policyholder on both sides of the transaction, a mutual
insurance company obviates the need for inflation risk to be
priced into the contract.
This same logic explains how mutual life insurance companies could deal with other zero-sum risks from long term contracts. Mutual life insurance companies do not need to price
these risks into the contract or include hard-to-understand
contractual provisions to account for these risks. Any loss to
the customer as residual claimant of the firm is offset by her or
174

See id. at 268–70.
Bruce D. Smith & Michael J. Stutzer, Adverse Selection, Aggregate Uncertainty, and the Role for Mutual Insurance Contracts, 63 J. BUS. 493, 504, 507–09
(1990); James A. Ligon & Paul D. Thistle, The Formation of Mutual Insurers in
Markets with Adverse Selection, 78 J. BUS. 529, 552–53 (2005). Historical studies
of insurance markets in other countries also attribute the emergence and early
market share enjoyed by mutual insurers to the advantages of their organizational form in addressing adverse selection problems and unpredictability of average losses among insured parties. Mike Adams et al., Mutuality as a Control for
Information Asymmetry: A Historical Analysis of the Claims Experience of Mutual
and Stock Fire Insurance Companies in Sweden, 1889 to 1939, 53 BUS. HIST. 1074,
1075–77 (2011): Pearson, supra note 160;.
176
See id. at 270–71.
175
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his benefit as policyholder.177 The mutual form also addresses
the severe asymmetries of information suffered by consumers
in the insurance context.178
3. Regulation as a Substitute for the Mutual Form
Just as banking regulation gave assurances to depositors
that banks organized as stock corporations were stable enough
to be entrusted with deposits, so too did the introduction of
state insurance regimes give greater assurance to policyholders
that investor-owned insurance companies would not underreserve or behave opportunistically.179 This reduced some of
the comparative advantage that the mutual form enjoyed in life
insurance. Professor Hansmann traces the introduction of
state insurance statutes in the 1850s and 1860s to the decline
in the ratio of mutual life insurers to their corporate
counterparts.
4. Why the Mutual Form Works in Life Insurance: Costs
to the Mutual Form
Professor Hansmann attributes the success of the mutual
form in life insurance to several additional factors. First, life
insurers historically required relatively little startup capital.180
However, the mutual form limited the ability of these firms to
raise additional capital beyond attracting new policyholders or
retaining earnings. As described below, the search for additional capital drove a wave of life insurers to demutualize at the
turn of the twenty-first century.181
Second, the mutual form in life insurance benefitted from
the fact that policyholders were buying relatively homogenous
products. This meant the interests of the firm’s residual claimants were largely aligned.182 Although the mutual form imposes high potential agency costs—a large number of dispersed
owners may be unable to effectively organize to discipline management—empirical evidence does not show a difference in average costs between stock and mutual life insurers. This may
be due to the fact that shareholders of life insurance corporations also face agency costs. However, more importantly,
changing the residual claimant to policyholders also ensures
177
178

See id.
Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies, supra note 167, at

R

132.
179
180
181
182

See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 271–72.
See id. at 273.
Infra section I.C.5.
See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 273.
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that management is not responsive to the demands of any
other claimant. Management thus has less incentive to behave
opportunistically vis-à-vis policyholders.
The benefits of the policyholder as residual claimant, however, diminish if the insurer seeks to offer multiple products,
particularly products outside life insurance.183 Less homogenous products would translate into potential greater conflicts
among the interests of policyholders. The desire to offer multiple products may provide a supplementary theoretical explanation for the wave of demutualization of life insurers explained
below.
5. Demutualization Wave Among Life Insurers at the
Turn of the Twenty-First Century
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the life insurance
industry experienced a wave of demutualization, with some of
the largest insurers choosing to become corporations and conduct IPOs. These companies included the following:184
Insurance Company
John Hancock
Manufacturers
Mutual of New York
MetLife
Principal
Prudential

Year of Demutualization
1999
1999
1998
2000
1998
2001

Scholars attribute this wave to a number of factors, including the following:
(1) a decline in consumer interest in life insurance products
compared to growing insurance company revenue from
wealth management and annuity products;
(2) the ending of Glass-Steagall’s prohibitions against insurance, banking, and securities businesses within the same
conglomerate;
(3) changes in the Internal Revenue Code that ended tax
advantages for mutual insurance companies; and
(4) the prospect of foreign insurance companies entering the
U.S. market.185
183

Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies, supra note 167, at

135.
184
Lal C. Chugh & Joseph W. Meador, Demutualization in the Life Insurance
Industry: A Study of Effectiveness, 27 REV. BUS. 10, 16 (2006).
185
Id. at 10.
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Studies have shown that access to capital is the primary
reason for insurance company demutualization.186 This does
not mean that mutuals do not have any advantages with respect to capital raising; in fact, they may have additional opportunities to raise capital during financial crises by raising
premia from policyholders.187 Other scholars found that a mix
of motivations—operational efficiency, access to capital and tax
advantages—drove demutualizations generally.188 One study,
however, found no efficiency gains for insurers that
demutualized.189
6. Size and Systemic Risk Concerns
In addition to losing the consumer/policyholder protection
benefits of the mutual form outlined above, this demutualization wave created significant systemic risk concerns. Demutualization allowed large insurance conglomerates to grow in
sheer size, connectedness to other financial institutions, and
importance to broader financial markets. It also may have
made them more fragile and susceptible to volatility in capital
markets, including via losses on the asset side of their balance
sheets and dependence on short term financing on the liability
side.190
Demutualization allowed life insurance companies to grow
their size and the scope of their operations.191 Several expanded heavily into capital markets activities, including the
following:
•

derivatives transactions;

•

lending via repurchase agreements (repos);

•

financing themselves through asset-backed securitization
vehicles; and

186
Krupa S. Viswanathan & J. David Cummins, Ownership Structure Changes
in the Insurance Industry: An Analysis of Demutualization, 70 J. RISK & INS. 401,
412–16 (2003); Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts & Richard D. Phillips, Form Over Matter: Differences in the Incentives to Convert Using Full Versus Partial Demutualization in the U.S. Life Insurance Industry, 79 J. RISK & INS. 305, 307, 330–31 (2012).
187
Laux & Muermann, supra note 146.
188
Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts & J. Tyler Leverty, The Demise of the Mutual
Organizational Form: An Investigation of the U.S. Life Insurance Industry, 42 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1011 (2010).
189
Vivian Jeng, Gene C. Lai & Michael J. McNamara, Efficiency and Demutualization: Evidence From the U.S. Life Insurance Industry in the 1980s and 1990s, 74
J. RISK & INS. 683, 704–09 (2007).
190
For an analysis of the systemic risk posed by insurance companies, see
Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81
U. CHI. L. REV. 1569 (2014).
191
Id. at 12 (citing McNamara & Rhee, supra note 158, at 221–31).
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engaging in securities lending.192

One can see examples of the growth of these activities by comparing the annual reports of the Prudential and MetLife five
years after their IPOs with the registration statements for their
IPOs. The annual reports five years later include more extensive disclosure on capital market activities, including products
offered to customers, investments in capital markets, and new
sources of financing for the company.193
Prudential194 and MetLife195 were two of the four nonbank
companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) designated as “Systemically Important Financial Institutions” pursuant to its authority under the Dodd-Frank
Act.196 The FSOC cited the capital markets activities of these
insurance companies in its determinations that these firms
192
E.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC.,
(Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Prudential%20Financial%20Inc.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLT2-PH65]
[hereinafter FSOC PRUDENTIAL DESIGNATION] (detailing risk from Prudential’s derivatives, repo, and securities lending businesses among others); FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S FINAL
DETERMINATION REGARDING METLIFE, INC. (Dec. 18, 2014), https://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/MetLife%20Public
%20Basis.pdf [https://perma.cc/6USN-K6LE] [hereinafter FSOC METLIFE DESIGNATION] (detailing risks of MetLife’s sponsoring and obtaining financing via securitization vehicles and securities lending).
193
Compare MetLife, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 5, 2004), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099219/000095012304002912/0000
950123-04-002912-index.htm [https://perma.cc/TDA7-S7S3] (detailing MetLife’s 2003 financial performance, note especially the high capital markets activity), with MetLife, Inc. Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Nov. 23, 1999), https:/
/www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099219/0000950123-99-010491-index.html [https://perma.cc/JG7K-3TYC] (detailing MetLife’s pre-IPO financial
situation and business model); compare Prudential Financial, Inc. Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1137774/000119312506041378/0001193125-06-041378-index.htm [https://
perma.cc/F52E-572Z] (detailing Prudential’s 2005 financial performance, note
especially high capital markets activity), with Prudential Financial, Inc. Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Apr. 9, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1137774/000095013001500607/0000950130-01-500607-index.htm
[https://perma.cc/UUB2-YJRG] (detailing Prudential’s pre-IPO financial situation and business model).
194
FSOC Prudential Designation, supra note 192.
195
FSOC MetLife Designation, supra note 192.
196
Another of the companies designated by FSOC, American International
Group (AIG), was an insurance conglomerate organized as a corporation. FIN.
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S
FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (July 8, 2013),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Basis%20of%20Final%20Determination%20Regarding%20American%20International%20Group,%20Inc.pdf [https://perma.cc/59W7-J4MT]. AIG was never
organized as a mutual. For the origins of the American International Group, see
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merited systemic designation and regulation by the Federal
Reserve.197 Although MetLife successfully challenged its designation in federal court198 and the FSOC later chose to rescind
the designations of all other companies,199 some scholars have
criticized the reasoning behind these court and agency decisions against designation and argue that large insurance conglomerates continue to pose systemic risk concerns.200
7. Mutuals in Property and Liability Insurance
One additional example from the insurance context points
to the circumstances in which the mutual form may prove successful in financial services. Professor Hansmann details how
the mutual form historically enjoyed success in property and
liability insurance.201 Even though some of the comparative
advantages enjoyed by mutual compared to investor-owned
firms in these business lines have dissipated, his analysis
reveals some critical components for the market success of the
mutual form. Mutuals enjoyed an advantage in providing
property and liability insurance to businesses in a time in
which insurance companies could not easily distinguish between the risks posed by potential policyholders. At the historical height of the mutual form in these business lines, actuarial
RON SHELP & AL EHRBAR, FALLEN GIANT: THE AMAZING STORY OF HANK GREENBERG AND
THE HISTORY OF AIG 35–39 (2nd ed. 2009).
197
FSOC Prudential Designation, supra note 192, at 2.
198
MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219,
230–36 (D.D.C. 2016).
199
E.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS
FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION
REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/
system/files/261/Prudential-Financial-Inc-Rescission.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J4N4-Q8SC] (justifying the decision to de-designate Prudential because the company now has a sustainable business model, capital strength, and a comprehensive risk management system); see also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, LIST OF
DESIGNATIONS, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/
default.aspx#nonbank [https://perma.cc/BGU4-35ZZ] (listing links to FSOC decisions to designate and rescind designations of major financial companies).
200
See Jeremy C. Kress, The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal Deregulation of
Prudential Financial, 71 STANFORD L. REV. ONLINE 171, 171–72 (2018), (criticizing
de-designation of Prudential); see also Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy &
Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches to
Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1458–65 (2019) (arguing that the
district court opinion in the MetLife case, the FSOC de-designation decisions, and
proposed FSOC changes to designation process all impose impossible standards
on designation); Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: DoddFrank and the Nonbank Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1851–60 (2017) (discussing effects of Dodd-Frank’s FSOC designation provisions on deterring large
nonbanks from engaging in activities that could pose systemic risks).
201
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 276–77.
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data were not available or reliable.202 The mutual form worked
because policyholders possessed greater information about
their own risks; they could solve the problem of asymmetric
information by screening each other for risk. This success depended on policyholders being relatively homogenous in terms
of the risks for which they were being insured. Similar risks
meant that the residual claimants to the firm had similar interests. Homogenous policyholders who co-existed in tightly knit
communities could also address the risk of moral hazard.203
Mutuals in property and liability insurance were particularly attractive when policyholders could not purchase insurance in competitive markets.204 Rather than pay less than
competitive rates, businesses would band together to form a
mutual. This points to an insight applicable to mutuals in
financial services more generally: customers facing impaired
competition provides an impetus for mutual formation.205
D. Common Threads Among Industries
1. Reasons for Demutualization; Industry Dynamics
Despite differences in their organizational forms, business
models, and historical evolutions, common threads tie together
the demutualization of investment banks, banks, savings and
loan associations, and insurance companies. When firms
abandoned the partnership or mutual form and conducted an
IPO, the existing owners often reaped significant payouts.206
The new investor-owned firms could deploy capital to expand
operations and acquire other companies.207 The acquiring
firms could use their own stock as consideration for these
transactions.208 Merger and acquisitions activity, in turn,
202

Id. at 277–80.
Other researchers have found advantages in the mutual form in terms of
mitigating moral hazard among policyholders. Lena Nekby, Pure Versus Mutual
Health Insurance: Evidence from Swedish Historical Data, 71 J. RISK & INS. 115
(2004); Bruce D. Smith & Michael Stutzer, A Theory of Mutual Formation and
Moral Hazard with Evidence from the History of the Insurance Industry, 8 REV. FIN.
STUD. 545 (1995).
204
Id. at 278–79.
205
Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies, supra note 167, at
149.
206
Chugh & Meador, supra note 184, at 15.
207
See Karl T. Muth & Andrew Leventhal, Mutuals: An Area of Legal Climate
Change, 9 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 597, 607–10, 612 (2018) (discussing the
benefits of mutualization and why a company chooses to mutualize).
208
Kimble C. Cannon & Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority Shareholder
Rights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants and
Maximizing Long-Term Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995
203
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spurred industry consolidation and the growth of
megafirms.209
The erosion of Glass-Steagall-era legal separations among
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies in the 1980s
and 1990s meant that these different firms could increasingly
compete with one another or join together under the umbrella
of a financial conglomerate.210 Indeed, the prospects of competition across the financial sector and industry consolidation
drove financial firms to seek to raise massive amounts of capital.211 Demutualization, industry consolidation, the disintegration of Glass-Steagall, and competition that crossed
financial sectors mutually reinforced one another in powerful
feedback loops. At the same time, enhanced global competition
and the prospect of entering foreign markets contributed to a
need for even more capital and additional waves of demutualization.212 By the turn of the twenty-first century, demutualization and these related dynamics transformed the U.S.
financial services sector. It was now dominated by large internationally active financial conglomerates that offered a full
range of financial services, ranging from depository banking to
traditional investment banking services (underwriting and
mergers and acquisitions advice) to investment funds to insurance to derivatives to trading and beyond.213
2. Compensation and Incentives; Shareholders as
Residual Claimants
Against this backdrop, demutualized corporate financial
institutions could also compensate employees with stock options and restricted stock.214 This benefitted employees who
enjoyed liquid assets that could appreciate dramatically in
value. This dynamic could also spark compensation races
among firms. It also radically altered the incentive structure of
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 725, 762 (describing triangular mergers, which often involve
using company stock as consideration).
209
See generally Nu Ri Jung, The Present and Future of the Financial Services
Industry: Convergence, Consolidation, Conglomeration, and Collaboration, 29
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 729, 739–43 (2011) (discussing how demutualization and corresponding mergers result in convergence, consolidation, and conglomeration in the
global financial services industry).
210
Wilmarth, Road to Repeal, supra note 49, at 452–55.
211
Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 49, at 975–81.
212
See Chugh & Meador, supra note 184, at 10–11 (describing global competition as one of several reasons for increased popularity in demutualization in the
life insurance market).
213
Jung, supra note 209, at 739–42, 789–91.
214
Chugh & Meador, supra note 184, at 11.
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a firm’s employees. Employees who could liquidate their ownership claims in public markets were less tightly tied to a firm
and its financial future.215 This raised agency costs and dulled
employee incentives to mitigate the risk-taking and protect the
reputation of their employers.216
Moreover, managers and employees of demutualized firms
were now responsive to a new residual claimant—investors in
public markers—rather than partners, depositors, or policyholders.217 Lynn Stout argued extensively that corporations
need not pursue a shareholder wealth maximization norm and
that they could take into account the interests of other stakeholders.218 Nevertheless, even if managers could take into account a wide set of values, various structures encouraged them
to focus on stock prices.219 Stock-based compensation, combined with the prospect of proxy fights and takeovers, meant
that managers and employees of corporate financial firms
placed significant focus on short term stock prices.220 This
focus can come at the expense of depositors, borrowers, policyholders, or consumers. These incentives also slant in favor of
increased financial institution risk-taking, including the kind
that led to failures and bailouts of financial firms during the
global financial crisis.
II
MUTUALIZING RISK ACROSS THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY:
COMMUNITIES OF FATE AND CLEARINGHOUSES
Colossal financial institution failures during the global crisis and the severe costs they inflicted on taxpayers and the
economy prompted Professor Saule Omarova to write her Wall
Street as Community of Fate article. Failures of certain entities
also prompted Congress to write into the Dodd-Frank Act (i)
requirements that derivatives be centrally cleared; and (ii) provisions regulating the entities that conduct this central clearing
215
Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 407, 414–16 (2006) (describing the shareholder right of transferability and
its implications).
216
See 2 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2096.10 (Callaghan & Co. 1917) (explaining these agency costs as a consequence of the separation of ownership and control).
217
See id. §§ 837.50, 848 (describing how a corporate director’s fiduciary duties flow to the shareholders and corporation and not to each other).
218
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 2–4, 27–29 (2012).
219
Id. at 19–21.
220
See generally id. at 63–69 (describing the reasons for the overemphasizing
of short-term results and stock prices).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN305.txt

2020]

unknown

REMUTUALIZATION

Seq: 41

28-JUL-20

17:16

837

as market utilities.221 However, the governance structures of
these modern clearing companies have changed radically in
recent years. Professor Saguato explores how the demutualization of clearing companies allows profit-motivated shareholders to increase the risk-taking of these entities with potentially
dramatic consequences for the financial institutions that use
them and for financial markets writ large.222 Both Professor
Omarova and Professor Saguato explore how mutual entities
collectively owned by financial institutions can make the financial sector more stable and reduce the incidence and severity of
financial crises.223
A. Communities of Fate
In Wall Street as Community of Fate, Saule Omarova proposes creating new self-regulatory mechanisms for the financial sector that would address the increasingly complex
financial products and activities of contemporary financial institutions.224 This complexity and the globalized nature of financial institutions means government regulators constantly
struggled to adapt their rules and supervision.225 Instead of
relying on regulators to compete in an arms race, Professor
Omarova advocates new self-regulatory structures.226 She describes the comparative advantage of private firms in identifying and regulating risk thus:
Private industry actors may be in the best position to identify
and understand underlying trends in the increasingly complex financial markets and to gather and analyze, in real
time, information most relevant to systemic risk management. Unconstrained by matters of formal jurisdiction, private firms are also better equipped to monitor and manage
their activities and risks on a global basis as an integrated
economic enterprise. Leveraging this unique position of private firms to control and regulate systemic risk in global
financial markets can add to ongoing efforts to strengthen
the government’s regulatory framework and create marketbased incentives for more prudent financial conduct.227
221
See Saguato, supra note 7, at 609–13 (describing Dodd-Frank provisions
governing central clearing of derivatives).
222
Id. at 642–46.
223
See id. at 604, 647–48; Omarova, supra note 4, at 474–75.
224
Omarova, supra note 4, at 438–39, 474–75.
225
Id. at 436–37.
226
Id. at 490–91.
227
Id. at 418–19.
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Professor Omarova’s ideas look back to the old self-regulatory
functions that U.S. stock and commodities exchanges played in
capital markets before they themselves demutualized in the
first decade of the twenty-first century.228 Her proposals also
recall the old function of clearinghouses, such as the New York
Clearinghouse. Founded early in the nineteenth century as a
central counterparty for banks to clear checks and settle financial accounts with one another, the New York Clearinghouse
evolved into a kind of proto-central bank.229 In response to a
series of banking panics in the middle of that century, the
Clearinghouse developed a regime by which it would make
emergency loans to member banks facing a liquidity shortfall.
Borrowing banks would pledge securities as collateral for the
loans. The risk of the borrowing bank failing was thus mutualized among all banks that were clearinghouse members. This
system gave assurances to depositors and other creditors of
member banks that their loans enjoyed backup liquidity.230
The clearinghouse pulled together member banks behind a collective veil. Creditors could not tell if individual banks faced a
liquidity crisis, but did not care as the collective security provided by the clearinghouse sufficed to calm market nerves.
This helped stave off or mitigate the severity of bank runs.231
The creators of the Federal Reserve System modeled its
own “lender of last resort” function after the New York Clearinghouse.232 The founding of the nation’s central bank in 1913
rendered this function of the Clearinghouse largely obsolete.
As with Professor Hansmann’s theory of bank regulation undermining the competitive advantage of mutual banks,233 public intervention in the area of emergency liquidity provision to
banks also hollowed out the usefulness of a private sector organizational form as a regulatory tool.
However, flash forwarding almost a century to the global
financial crisis, the Federal Reserve found its own emergency
lender of last resort functions outdated. Large nonbanks that
performed bank-like functions suffered their own liquidity crises. Similarly, various capital markets, including securitization, repurchase agreement (repo), asset-backed commercial
228

See Karmel, supra note 5, at 368–70.
See Gorton, supra note 6, at 278–81 (describing the clearing house as “an
organized market—a single location where exchange between banks occurred”).
230
Id. at 279–82.
231
Id. at 277.
232
See id. (noting that the Federal Reserve System “was simply the nationalization of the private clearinghouse system”).
233
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 255.
229
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paper, and money market mutual funds, had come to offer
bank like functions; they transformed illiquid assets into theoretically highly liquid and low risk investments that institutional investors used as the equivalent of large deposit
accounts. However, losses on mortgage-related investments
caused investors to flee these markets and fire sales to begin.
These markets—which some scholars have collectively called
the “shadow banking system”—in effect suffered shadow banking runs.234 The Federal Reserve creatively interpreted its
emergency lending authority under the Federal Reserve Act to
lend to non-banks and develop novel “liquidity facilities” to
provide liquidity to these capital markets.235 However, upset
with “bailouts” of the financial industry, Congress curbed the
ability of the Federal Reserve to take these actions in the
future.236
Just as failures of public regulation raise the prospect of
reviving the use of alternative organizational forms for individual banks and insurance companies, so too do the shortcomings of central banks as prudential regulators and liquidity
providers of last resort call for reexamining a possible role for
the old clearinghouses. These revived clearinghouses would
differ drastically from the derivative clearinghouses created
under the Dodd-Frank, which create a central intermediary for
derivatives trading.237 Instead, new financial industry clearinghouses could provide emergency liquidity to nonbanks or to
capital markets that engage in liquidity transformation and are
thus subject to the risk of bank run dynamics. Like the nineteenth-century clearinghouses, this type of organization would
gather together financial institutions participating in these

234
See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run
on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 428 (2012) (noting that repo and other short-term
debt experienced runs during the financial crisis); Gary Gorton, Slapped in the
Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007, at 14 , Nat’l Bur.
Econ. Res. Working Paper (May 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401882 [https://perma.cc/3KKZJJ4L] (describing the “shadow banking system” as combining repurchase agreements “with securitization . . . to accomplish the same function for firms [as
traditional banking systems]”).
235
Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and Unusual Circumstances: The Federal
Reserve and the US Financial Crisis, in LAW REFORM AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 269,
287 (Kern Alexander & Niamh Moloney eds. 2011).
236
Id. at 299–303.
237
For analyses of the roles played by the derivatives clearinghouses mandated by Dodd-Frank, see Adam J. Levitin, The Tenuous Case for Derivatives
Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 446–47 (2013); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic
Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 391–92 (2013).
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markets. Each member would agree to contribute capital to a
fund which could then be used for:
(a) emergency loans to members suffering a liquidity shock;
(b) guarantees to investors purchasing instruments in a frozen capital market; or
(c) direct purchases of those instruments by the clearinghouse to unfreeze the market.

These functions mirror the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department interventions in 2008 and 2009 during the global
financial crisis. They also mimic the classic government interventions to stave off any banking crisis: emergency loans from
a lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and central bank
open market operations.238
This new clearinghouse would not have the statutory jurisdictional limits faced by the Federal Reserve. This solution
would put the onus for monitoring and governing the risktaking of firms on the clearinghouse and its members. These
parties enjoy an informational advantage over government regulators in terms of understanding financial products and activities, their risks, and the way these products, activities, and
risks evolve over time. Moral hazard could be mitigated by the
fact that each clearinghouse member would bear part of the
risk of its activities. Members would also worry about reputational loss for violating clearinghouse rules. Reputational loss
can be fatal in the banking industry, as confidence in a bank’s
credible commitment to meet short term obligations is integral
to its survival.239 Members could impose the informal sanctions of refusing to conduct business with firms that flout rules
or externalize too much risk on the clearinghouse.
B. Clearinghouses and the Clearing of Securities and
Derivatives
Professor Saguato examines the modern clearinghouse,
which is similar but distinct from the nineteenth-century
banking clearinghouses described by Gorton. Instead of mutualizing risk industrywide in the midst of a bank panic,240 the
modern clearinghouse or clearing company facilitates the
238
ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 454 (2014)
(describing government crisis interventions in the shadow banking system as akin
to traditional government interventions in bank runs); Kathryn Judge, The First
Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (2016).
239
See generally Julie Andersen Hill, Regulating Bank Reputation Risk, 54 GA.
L. REV. 523, 539 (2020) (examining bank run risk).
240
See Gorton, supra note 6, at 279–82.
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clearing and settlement of securities and derivative trades.241
By interposing itself as a central counterparty to all financial
trades made on a given securities or derivatives exchange, a
modern central clearing company reduces the risk that a party
to any particular trade will suffer financial losses should the
buyer or seller on the other side become insolvent.242 The
clearing company assumes counterparty risk. It protects itself
by seeking to offset risks from multiple trades against each
other and monitoring the risk of all traders that use its services
(who are called “members”).243 The clearing company requires
that members limit their trading risk exposure to the clearing
company, post collateral to secure their settlement obligations
to the clearinghouse, and contribute to a guaranty fund to
protect the clearinghouse from losses when a member defaults
on a trade.244
Professor Saguato explains how clearing companies became a centerpiece of post-crisis financial reform, including the
landmark Dodd-Frank Act. He draws attention to a less understood trend: the demutualization of a large number of securities and derivatives clearinghouses.245 He argues that this
demutualization comes at significant cost. Investor-owned
clearinghouses face strong pressure to take on more risk to
earn greater returns for shareholders.246 This increases the
risk for clearinghouse members and ultimately for global financial markets who would suffer massive but uncertain losses
should a clearinghouse fail.247 Professor Saguato locates this
risk in specific consequences of clearinghouse demutualization, namely the transfer of control rights and residual claims
to shareholders and away from users/members. This transfer
has perverse consequences, as it is the users/members who
bear a higher degree of risk of clearinghouse failure.248
He outlines several potential policy responses, all of which
involve remutualizing control of a clearinghouse and the risk of
clearinghouse failure. These policies seek to give control rights
over the clearinghouse to the parties that bear the greatest risk
for a clearinghouse’s losses. Professor Saguato outlines the
advantages and drawbacks of multiple policy approaches in241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

Saguato, supra note 7, at 604–12, 623–24.
Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 618–22.
Id. at 618–22.
Id. at 625–30.
Saguato, supra note 7, at 635.
Id. at 630–32.
Id. at 641–42.
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cluding the following: requiring clearinghouses to remutualize;
imposing additional liability on shareholders of an investorowned clearinghouse; and creating hybrid governance structures to split control rights between shareholders and
members.249
C. Mutual Insurance for a Financial Sector
Professors Omarova and Saguato consider a similar kind of
problem: how to insure against widespread financial institution failure and systemic risk in important financial markets.
Their proposals resemble one another in that both look to mutualize risk among firms in a crucial segment of the financial
services industry. Professor Hansmann might have predicted
their conclusions when he wrote about the advantage of the
mutual form in insurance in bearing industrywide risks. Professor Hansmann writes:
To the extent that the average loss level of an industry cannot
be accurately predicted, an insurance company writing property or liability insurance for that industry will bear risk that
it cannot reduce by writing a large number of policies. Such
industrywide risk may be more efficiently borne by the firms
in the industry than by an investor-owned insurance company. Although the potential variation in industrywide
losses may be large as a proportion of expected earnings for a
company insuring the industry, they are likely to be much
smaller relative to the earnings of the industry itself. A mutual company has the advantage that it eliminates those
risks that are idiosyncratic to individual firms within the industry, while it passes back, pro rata, to all firms in the
industry the risk of variance in the overall loss experience of
the industry as a whole.250

Mutualizing risk among financial firms does not necessarily obviate the need for government regulation though.
Whether by mistake or intention, financial firms within a mutual could increase the overall magnitude or correlation of their
collective risk-taking to a degree that would imperil financial
markets and the broader economy.251 Government oversight of
industry-wide mutuals thus remains crucial.

249
250
251

Id. at 659–65.
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 280.
Levitin, supra note 237, at 451.
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III
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
If alternative organizational forms can once again become
powerful tools to limit excessive financial institution risk-taking, police market conduct and protect consumers, and promote access to credit and financial services, the question
becomes how to promote the use of these forms. Before answering this question, it is helpful to summarize the different
organizational forms discussed above. The following table lists
for each organizational form, the policy values the form promotes and any related “remutualization” proposals advanced
by legal scholars:
MUTUAL FIRMS, POLICY CONCERNS, AND PROPOSALS
Old Mutual
Firm
Investment
Banks as
Partnerships

Credit unions
and banking
cooperatives

Mutual
insurance
companies
Bank
clearinghouses

Concern Addressed
Excessive risk
taking/systemic risk;
exploiting customers;
law breaking
Excessive risk-taking
and insolvency; market
conduct/consumer
financial protection;
access to credit.
Market conduct;
consumer financial
protection; access to
insurance (Hansmann)
Systemic risk; insuring
against bank panics

Contemporary
Mutual Proposal
Personal liability
commitments for
individual
investment bankers
(Painter and Hill)

Financial industry
self-regulation/
“Communities of
Fate” (Omarova);
Derivatives
clearinghouses
organized as
mutuals (Saguato)

A. The Limits of Private Ordering
One approach to encouraging the use of these organizational forms and promoting remutualization would be to rely
upon private ordering on the theory that firms organized as
partnerships or mutuals would accrue reputational benefits.
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For example, use of the partnership or mutual form might send
a clear signal that the firm does not behave opportunistically
with respect to its customers. Private ordering is indeed the
approach advocated by some legal scholars, such as Professors
Claire Hill and Richard Painter in their proposal for “covenant
banking.”252 They advocate a series of off-the-rack contractual
provisions that investment banks could use to impose personal
liability on crucial, well-compensated employees.253 Professors
Hill and Painter believe that firms that opt into this contractual
regime will benefit by sending a clear signal to their creditors,
investors, and customers that the firm’s most important personnel stand behind the firm’s actions.254 This credible commitment would signal that the firm can be trusted to make
prudent decisions, guard its solvency, and avoid fines for opportunistic behavior vis-à-vis customers.
The evidence that private ordering alone will suffice is,
however, weak. Investment banks have not opted for increased
personal liability for their employees. There is scant evidence
that insurance companies or banks are converting back to the
mutual form. The one piece of evidence that market forces
might play a small role came in the 2011 “Bank Transfer Day”
and “Dump Your Bank Day” protest actions organized by consumer groups and the Occupy Wall Street movement.255 In
encouraging customers of large banks to move their deposits to
smaller community banks and credit unions, these groups did
enjoy a measure of success. In October 2011, 650,000 customers joined credit unions, more than the number who joined in
all of 2010. That same year, Bank of America sparked consumer outrage with a new $5 debit card fee, and, in the onemonth period afterwards, approximately $4.5 billion in deposits moved from large banks to U.S. credit unions. However,
economists saw these developments as largely symbolic given
the vast number of accounts and deposits still held by large
financial conglomerates.
Private ordering alone is unlikely to trigger a shift to partnership and mutual forms for several reasons. First, reputa252

HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 8.
See generally id. at 149–64 (describing the features of different specific
covenant forms).
254
See id. at 164–65 (arguing that “many private actors who have a stake in
and interact with banks should benefit from a covenant banking regime.”).
255
Gloria Goodale, Bank Transfer Day: How Much Impact Did It Have?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 7, 2011), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/
2011/1107/Bank-Transfer-Day-How-much-impact-did-it-have [https://
perma.cc/MF9P-EWCA].
253
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tion may not adequately discipline large financial
conglomerates because these firms operate in markets that are
far from competitive. For example, the high degree of market
concentration, particularly in underwriting and advisory services, derivatives, trading, and other specialized investment
banking businesses, dulls the negative competitive impact on
an investment bank from scandals, including those involving
allegations that the bank acted opportunistically against customer interests.256
Second, private ordering alone is unlikely to yield the optimal use of partnership and mutual organizational forms for the
same reasons that markets fail to produce optimal levels of
systemic risk, consumer protection, and consumer access to
financial services in the first place. Market failures pervade
financial services. For example, systemic risk arises when the
failure of one of more banks or other financial institutions has
severe negative spillover effects on other firms, entire financial
markets, or the larger economy.257 The parties impacted cannot adequately protect themselves via contract or investment
diversification. Banks and other financial firms thus do not
bear the full cost of their risky investments and their financial
failure. It is unlikely that market forces alone will push these
firms toward an organizational form that internalizes and
reduces this systemic risk.
Similarly, market forces may not produce an optimal level
of consumer protection given that consumers suffer from
asymmetric information258 and behavioral biases.259 These
dynamics impede consumers from choosing products that offer
the lowest overall cost and highest benefits and leave them
prone to hidden fees and other costs.260 Given the limits to
consumer financial decision-making, financial firms that chose

256
See, e.g., Emilie R. Feldman, A Basic Quantification of the Competitive
Implications of the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 29 REV. INDUS. ORG. 193, 208–09
(2006) (concluding that the Department of Justice punishment of Enron’s Arthur
Andersen only “maintain[ed] competition . . . in the already-concentrated accounting industry”).
257
Kaufman & Scott, supra note 14, at 371–72.
258
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 276–77.
259
Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 11, at 39.
260
See, e.g., id. (describing how firms can take advantage of biased consumers
with contracts offering incentives, but also generating greater payments);
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 228 (noting that, as a result of asymmetric information, customers may be “in a peculiarly poor position to determine, with reasonable cost or effort, the quality or the quantity of the services they receive from a
firm”).
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mutual forms to attract customers may not enjoy socially optimal results.
B. Tax Subsidies
Tax policy provides one vehicle to subsidize mutual companies providing this access. In addition, tax preferences for investment banks organized as partnerships and banks and
insurance companies organized as mutuals can promote the
use of these organizational forms. Tax preferences can subsidize not only wider consumer access but also the other policy
benefits offered by these types of organizations: reducing systemic risk and promoting consumer protection. Although tax
scholars routinely object to the use of taxation as an instrument for new policy objectives,261 remutualization is closely
connected to traditional tax policy concerns for two reasons.
First, many mutual banks and lenders historically enjoyed
tax breaks because they were organized as nonprofit or quasinon-profit entities.262 Likewise, historically, the Internal Revenue Code contained tax preferences for mutual insurance companies.263 These tax preferences for life insurers were reduced
in 1959,264 and their elimination at the end of the twentieth
century provided an impetus for the wave of demutualization
described above.265 Restoring these tax advantages would be
justified by the benefits that mutual banks and insurance companies provide in terms of more consumer-friendly financial
products and greater consumer access. In many respects,
these benefits make these mutual entities more like nonprofit
entities than their for-profit/investor-owned counterparts.
Second, the reduction in systemic risk that comes with the
partnership and mutual form also argues for tax preferences.
Reductions in the systemic risk caused by financial firms that
are organized as partnerships or mutual companies translates
into lower spillover costs imposed on financial markets and the
macroeconomy.266 It also means a lower impact on the public
261
See, e.g., Hearing on “Tax: Fundamentals in Advance of Reform” Before the
S. Comm. On Finance, 110th Cong. 9–10 (2008) (statement of Jason Furman,
Senior Fellow and Director of the Hamilton Project, The Brookings Institute) (asserting that the concept of tax neutrality, the notion that taxes should be levied
without regard for policy goals, is widely accepted in principle).
262
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 244.
263
Id. at 275.
264
Id. at 275–76.
265
HANSMANN, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
266
See generally Kaufman & Scott, supra note 14, at 373 (noting that a firm
may reduce loss by examining the risk that other similarly situated market participants face).
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fisc. This results not only from the reduced need for government interventions to rescue failing firms and frozen financial
markets, but also from avoiding the losses to government revenue during financial crises. Reduced impacts on the government fisc justifies lower tax rates for investment banks
organized as partnerships and banks and insurance companies organized as mutuals compared to their respective counterparts that are organized as corporations.
C. Regulatory Preferences
Policymakers can also grant regulatory preferences to partnerships and mutually owned financial companies to lower the
regulatory “tax rate” on these firms. Of course, a lower regulatory tax on these firms operates as a regulatory tax premium on
firms organized as corporations. Regulatory preferences might
offer the most desirable policy approach for encouraging
remutualization.
Regulatory preferences should ideally come in the policy
area in which the partnership or mutual company outperforms
their corporate counterparts. For example, to the extent that
investment bank partnerships pose less systemic risk than corporate firms, they can and should be subject to lighter prudential regulations such as lower regulatory capital requirements
and lower leverage requirements. Activities restrictions, such
as the Volcker Rule prohibition on proprietary trading,267 could
also be relaxed for these investment banks. Investment bank
partnerships would face internal rather than external disincentives to take excessive risks.
One of the advantages of using the organizational form as a
regulatory tool is that it may offer greater social benefits or
reduced social costs compared to traditional financial regulations. As noted in Part IV below, by creating structures for
liability and control and by redefining the residual claimant,
the organizational form transforms the incentives of the firm’s
owners, management, and employees. These changed incentives require less government-imposed process-based compliance rules. Historically, this logic prompted financial

267
Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary
Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 515, 515 (2011) (offering rationale for Volcker Rule provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act).
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regulators to grant more favorable regulatory treatment to mutually owned companies.268
In several circumstances, policymakers not only should
grant regulatory preferences to partnerships or mutual companies, but they may be under a statutory mandate to do so. For
example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company Improvement Act requires that the Federal Deposit Insurance Company
base the premia it charges for deposit insurance on the specific
risk level of a bank failing.269 If depositor-owned banks pose
less of a risk of failure,270 then they should pay less for deposit
insurance.
Regulatory preferences do pose a measurement challenge.
Policymakers must determine the level of reduced systemic
risk, enhanced consumer protection, or wider consumer access
that a particular organizational form offers compared to corporate entities. However, this measurement challenge is by no
means insurmountable, and it already permeates all of financial regulation. Moreover, empirical data on the policy benefits
offered by particular organizational forms, such as reduced
failure rates by mutual banks and savings and loan associations compared to investor-owned counterparts,271 provides a
starting point for analysis.
D. Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Civil Settlements
by Regulators
Policymakers can use more direct means to encourage
remutualization. In the last two decades, deferred prosecution
agreements in criminal cases272 and settlement agreements in
civil lawsuits brought by regulators273 have become important
268
See Hansmann, supra note 42, at 135–38 (exploring the historical record of
the mutual form).
269
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
270
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
271
See id.
272
See generally PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 38–68, 228 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow
eds., 2011) (describing the positive shift in government use of deferred prosecution agreements (DPA) as a means of incentivizing structural change toward compliance amongst corporations); see also Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of
Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 457–60 (2014) (noting that DPAs have
become a pillar of white-collar criminal enforcement in recent decades).
273
The 2003 settlement among regulators (including the New York State Attorney General and the SEC) and ten investment banks imposing new rules on
stock analyst practices at those firms represented a landmark in using civil settlements by regulators to impose new rules on the financial firms. For a description
of the settlement, see Stephen Labaton, Wall Street Settlement: The Overview; 10
Wall Street Firms Reach Settlement in Analyst Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2003),
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regulatory tools. Prosecutors and regulatory agencies have
used these agreements to impose new legal requirements on
financial institutions albeit via contract rather than by statute
or rulemaking.274 Prosecutors or agencies might use this
power to require a financial institution accused of breaking the
law to convert to an alternative organizational form.
There is a certain symmetry to this use of prosecutorial or
civil regulatory power. For example, an investment bank facing
serious accusations of defrauding customers might be required
to convert to a partnership on the theory that that organizational form better aligns the firm’s incentives with those of
customers. Similarly, a large bank accused of widespread
abuses of depositors or borrowers might be required to mutualize given evidence that that organizational form better protects
consumers.
Requiring conversion or mutualization is a drastic remedy,
but much financial institutions malfeasance is drastic. Fines,
even when they total billions of dollars, might simply represent
the cost of doing business for large financial conglomerates.275
Using the organizational form to restructure a firm’s incentives
would save prosecutors or regulators from having to monitor
compliance compared to settlements that impose new governance processes or procedures. The public would have greater
assurance that the settlement would fundamentally alter a
firm’s incentives rather than represent a weak and ephemeral
compromise.276 This type of condition could constitute a sighttps://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/29/business/wall-street-settlement-over
view-10-wall-st-firms-reach-settlement-analyst.html [https://perma.cc/4AYQ48CV].
Detailed mandates for compliance programs have now become a routine and
central part of civil settlements between regulators and financial firms (as well as
nonfinancial firms). See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2086–91 (2016). The history of civil settlements mandating compliance programs dates to well before the global financial
crisis or the Enron scandal. Cf. F. Joseph Warin & Jason S. Schwartz, Corporate
Compliance Programs as a Component of Plea Agreements and Civil and Administration Settlements, 24 J. CORP. L. 71, 73–83 (1998) (exploring historical case
examples of civil settlements leading to compliance programs).
274
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 272, at 75–76.
275
E.g., Peter J. Henning, Guilty Pleas and Heavy Fines Seem to Be Cost of
Business for Wall St., N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 20, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/guilty-pleas-and-heavyfines-seem-to-be-cost-of-business-for-wall-st.html [https://perma.cc/NNR8G6VT] (documenting criminal and civil settlements in which financial conglomerates are repeat offenders).
276
For a magisterial empirical analysis and critique of the effectiveness of
prosecutorial settlements with financial and other corporations, see BRANDON L.
GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014).
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nificant improvement over the successful prosecution of financial firms. As the Arthur Andersen indictment in the Enron
scandal demonstrates, criminal prosecution could lead to the
demise of firms, which might reduce competition in already
oligopolistic industries.277
E. Promoting Clearinghouses
Selecting appropriate policy tools to mutualize systemic
risk via clearinghouses presents particularly thorny questions.
Centralizing systemic risk may exacerbate the “too-big-to-fail”
problem and heighten rather than lessen reliance on the government safety net.278 However, the systemic risk posed by
shadow banking markets, sketched out in Part II above, demands to be addressed. Bank-run dynamics in repo and other
wholesale funding markets, asset-backed securities markets,
and any other capital markets that perform liquidity or maturity transformation remains a persistent, pervasive, and significant threat to financial stability. Policymakers and scholars
have urged action to reduce reliance by banks and financial
conglomerates on these markets as a source of funding.279
This might be accomplished through a mix of regulatory restrictions and Pigouvian taxes on bank leverage or financial
transaction taxes. Consistent with the regulatory preference
approach outlined above, these regulations or taxes might be
lightened in the case of entities and activities that are subject
to a clearinghouse’s support and are governed by the clearinghouse’s rules.
This might be combined with explicit prohibitions on the
government safety net extending to a clearinghouse (and certainly to firms and markets not covered by the clearinghouse)
of the kind Congress placed in the Dodd-Frank Act. However,
that sort of statutory restriction may not represent a fully credible commitment. Faced with a massive financial crisis, a future Congress might conclude it has no attractive option other
277
See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the
Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107–110 (2006) (criticizing
prosecution of accounting firm); Feldman, supra note 256, at 205–09 (estimating
competitive impact of firm leaving auditor market).
278
Concerns with centralizing systemic risk have animated numerous critiques of the other form of clearinghouse—the institutions that centralize the clearing and settlement of derivatives trades. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 237, at
458–61, 463–65 (analyzing the comparative critique of OTC derivatives).
279
See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at Ass’n of American Law Schools 6 (June 6, 2014), https://fraser.st
louisfed.org/files/docs/historical/federal%20reserve%20history/bog_members_
statements/tarullo20140609a.pdf [https://perma.cc/RX9S-TNWB].
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than to relax the restriction. Moreover, policymakers might
search for creative workarounds. On the other hand, should
the restriction effectively bind the government, it might remove
any effective intervention to stave off a full-blown financial crisis. These sorts of dilemmas argue for proceeding with extreme
caution with any efforts to mutualize risk in a clearinghouse.
A successful clearinghouse or any mutualization of systemic risk among financial firms would not obviate the need for
government involvement and regulation. The prospect of financial firms collectively using a clearinghouse to externalize systemic risk on the government in a game of chicken means that
regulators must closely oversee the internal rules the clearinghouse uses to govern the risk-taking of its members.280 Indeed, when advocating for mutualizing systemic risk among
financial conglomerates and transforming Wall Street into a
“community of fate,” Professor Omarova used the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s approach to self-regulatory
organizations as a model.281 These organizations pass and enforce rules to govern member financial firms, but their decisions are subject to review by the SEC.282
F. Less than Full Remutualization: Hybrid Forms
Policymakers might conclude that financial institutions
should enjoy some of the benefits of investor-owned corporations, including the enhanced ability to raise large amounts of
capital. Policymakers might then choose to promote financial
institutions taking hybrid forms. For example, investment
banks owned by investors might require key employees to hold
a large collective “partnership” stake. Some investment banks,
such as Goldman Sachs, did just this: they chose to retain at
least some elements of partnership compensation and nomenclature even after they converted to a corporation and conducted an IPO.283
280
This too has clear parallels with derivatives clearinghouses. Scholars have
argued that derivatives clearinghouse can successfully reduce systemic risk only
with robust rules, such as position limits and margin requirements, that limit the
clearinghouse’s exposure to member firms. Levitin, supra note 237, at 454–56,
460–64.
281
Omarova, supra note 4, at 483–86.
282
Id. at 417–18.
283
Susanne Craig, How Goldman Makes (and Unmakes) Its Partners, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2010), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/howgoldman-makes-and-unmakes-its-partners/ [https://perma.cc/KR7J-7VYN]
(“When it was private, the partners were the owners, sharing in the profits, and in
some cases having to put in money to shore up losses. To retain that team spirit
as a public company, Goldman continued to name partners.”).
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Professors Hill and Painter criticize Goldman Sachs for
breaking laws and taking advantage of clients throughout their
book.284 This underscores the messiness of hybrid forms. If
policymakers pursue a hybrid approach, they should specify
off-the-rack forms with carefully designed control rights, liability mechanisms, and residual claims. The potential for gamesmanship of hybrid forms and conflicts among various
stakeholders reduces the attractiveness of attempts to split the
baby of organizational entity choice. There is considerable
value in assigning clear ultimate control rights, liability, and
residual claims to a single group.
IV
CRITIQUES AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF
REMUTUALIZATION
Promoting remutualization—the shift toward investment
banks as partnerships and banks and insurance companies as
mutual companies—faces potential challenges and raises potential objections beyond the question of designing appropriate
policy instruments. This Part IV examines several potential
downsides to remutualization, but it concludes that the use of
organizational form—partnerships and mutual companies—as
a tool of financial regulation offers numerous comparative advantages vis-à-vis traditional financial rules.
Returning to Professor Hansmann’s framework, the optimal organizational form would minimize the sum of the following: (i) market contracting costs for nonowner patrons of a firm;
and (ii) ownership costs for those patrons who are the firm’s
residual claimants.285 This Article has thus far largely focused
on evidence of the benefits of mutual forms in terms of reducing the risk that financial institutions will:
•

take excessive risk, fail, and generate spillover costs for
customers, counterparties, and financial markets;

•

exploit customers and consumers; or

•

break laws or engage in misconduct.

If a firm’s clients, customers, and counterparties or participants in broader financial markets are not owners of the firms,
284
See, e.g., HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 100–05 (“To put the problem in
the simplest terms, the interests of the client continue to be sidelined in the way
the firm operates and thinks about making money.”).
285
See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 48 (discussing both costs of market contracting and costs of ownership).
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they would face difficulties in contracting with firms in the
market to reduce these risks.
However, the other side of the ledger must also be considered. Subpart IV.A below considers the costs of ownership associated with partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives.
Subparts IV.B and IV.C then examine whether owners of these
alternative forms could really oversee large and complex modern financial firms. Subpart IV.D outlines the comparative advantages to the organizational form as a regulatory tool relative
to other traditional forms of financial regulation. Subpart IV.E
briefly looks at the impact of organizational form on institutional culture within a firm. Subpart IV.F examines other potential public costs that come with economic clubs, namely
anticompetitive and discriminatory behavior.
A. The Costs of Ownership for Partnerships, Mutuals, and
Cooperatives (and the Comparative Benefits of
Investor-Owned Corporations)
The costs of ownership of a firm include: agency costs/the
costs of mitigating managerial opportunism; costs of reduced
diversification for owners; and costs of raising capital. Each of
these is examined below in turn.
1. Agency Costs/Managerial Opportunism
Demutualization in the financial services sector from the
1970s onwards coincided with a rising concern in elite academic, policymaking, and business circles about agency costs
in the U.S. economy.286 Converting partnerships and mutuals
to investor-owned corporations, aligning the incentives of corporate management with shareholders, and promoting shareholder wealth maximization became dominant legal and
economic policy norms.287 Partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives may appear at first blush to have a comparative disadvantage to investor-owned corporations in terms of mitigating
management opportunism. Shareholders in corporations have
286
The agency cost lens for analyzing business associations reached new
prominence with Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976); see also Carson et al., supra note 159, at 17 (“[D]emutualization may be
motivated by attempts to control associated agency costs . . .”).
287
Supra notes 135–40 and accompanying text. See generally HANSMANN,
supra note 12, at 35–38, 40 (providing historical and analytical framework for
changes in organizational form); HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 105–06 (providing historical context for investment banks switching from partnerships to public
corporations).
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greater ability to discipline management by selling shares and
exiting the firm, and corporations can pay managers in stock.
Partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives create structural obstacles to owners entering and exiting firms.288 Owners also
face daunting collective action problems in monitoring and
controlling management. However, Professor Hansmann argues that agency costs concerns are partially mitigated by the
identity of the residual claimant of partnerships, mutuals, and
cooperatives. Management of these firms may shirk but they
have less incentive to exploit owners because there is no other
residual claimant—particularly no profit-motivated capital
providers—to favor.289 As noted above, evidence from mutual
insurance companies does not indicate that mutual firms underperform compared to investor-owned firms in terms of
prices offered to consumers or other financial metrics.290
2. Diversification
The ownership stake of partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives represents a bundled financial interest. Partnership
stakes essentially combine an investment of capital with an
investment of labor (i.e., an equity ownership stake plus an
implicit salary).291 Owners of a bank or insurance mutual receive an ownership stake bundled together with one or more
financial products (e.g., a bank deposit, access to credit and
payments services, or an insurance policy).292 Members of a
mutualized financial clearinghouse possess an equity stake
coupled with rights to access the clearinghouse’s platform.293
Were these interests to be decoupled, these respective stakeholders could still receive the respective financial product or
service, but invest their capital in other financial assets. However, because these various interests are bundled, the owners
of these different firms incur an opportunity cost, particularly a
288
E.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 402, 701 (1997), https://www.uniform
laws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=
D4bd53b5-0e2a-d71e-6d84-66a26e296324&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/
LX32-S7Y8] (describing model law provisions governing admission and disassociation of partners). Obtaining an ownership stake a mutual insurance company
requires purchasing a policy, and surrendering or cancelling that policy ends that
ownership relationship. About Mutual Insurance Companies, NAT’L ASSOC. MUTUAL
INS. COS., https://www.namic.org/about/mutuals [https://perma.cc/R8RBFHCH] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
289
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 273.
290
Supra notes 163–74 and accompanying text.
291
Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, supra note 42, at 292–96 (describing
economics of investment bank partnerships and other “worker-owned” firms).
292
See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 269–70.
293
Saguato, supra note 7, at 647–48.
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lost opportunity to diversify their investment portfolio.294 This
particular cost of ownership inheres with the traditional partnership, mutual, or cooperative form.
3. Costs of Raising Capital/Capital Needs
The more important benefits that come with an investorowned corporation—and the costs that come with the partnership, mutual, or cooperative form—relate to the ability to raise
significant amounts of capital.295 The question then becomes
for what purposes is the additional capital made possible by
the corporate form actually used.
As noted above, demutualization enabled capital to be
raised for investments in technology. Some of this technology
benefitted the clients and customers of a demutualized firm.
Some technological investment was necessary for financial
firms to survive.296 Yet scholars have asked trenchant questions regarding how much of technological innovation by financial institutions in the last four decades has yielded a net social
benefit. Much investment in technology may have represented
wasteful arms races that increased and camouflaged financial
institution risk-taking, systemic risk generation, and consumer exploitation.297
Demutualized firms also used capital to compete and restore eroded profit margins. Financial institutions, such as
investment banks, switched to the corporate form as regulatory
changes reduced their profit margins and induced them to
enter riskier business lines.298 However, whether these
changes in the business models of financial firms represented a
net social gain proves debatable. Demutualization may have
added unnecessary fuel to the competitive bonfire in which
financial institutions pushed one another to take greater risk,
at the expense of customers and taxpayers. Financial firms
sought capital to compete firms in the same financial sector, in
other financial sectors, or across borders. Demutualization in
each of investment banking, banking, and insurance may have
created a competitive spiral which drove more risk-taking and
more demutualization within industries. We should be cautious about whether efforts to remutualize the industry can
294

HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 281–82.
See Viswanathan & Cummins, supra note 186, at 415–16.
296
Supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
297
For a magisterial consideration of the purposes, benefits, and costs of new
technologies and innovation in financial services, see CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND
THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE (2017).
298
Supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text.
295
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completely reverse transformational changes in banking, investment banking, and insurance.299
These transformational changes had ostensible benefits.300 They resulted in financial conglomerates that could
cross-sell products to consumers. In addition to having the
capital to acquire firms in other financial sectors, investorowned corporations do not face a structural impediment to
selling a range of financial products that mutuals do. As noted
above, mutual banks and insurance companies thrive when
owners have homogenized interests. A mutual that offers a
range of products and services would have a heterogeneous set
of residual claimants with conflicting interests.301 Furthermore, larger investment banks, banks, and insurance companies could achieve economies of scale and diversify risk,
whereas investment bank partnerships and bank and insurance mutuals face constraints on their growth.302
However, a dark side exists to all these benefits enjoyed by
investor-owned financial firms. Financial institutions may face
increased conflicts of interest when operating different business lines and selling different products to customers and clients.303 Larger size translates into more severe systemic
consequences when a firm fails. At the extreme, large financial
conglomerates create “too-big-to-fail” concerns.304 The flip side
of diversification across asset classes and financial markets is
the creation of transmission lines for financial contagion:
losses suffered by financial firms in one market can spread to
other markets.305 Conglomerates also create opportunities for
subsidiaries to improperly transfer government guaranties and

299
For an overview of this transformation, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition,
Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215.
300
See id. at 223.
301
Supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
302
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 278–82.
303
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Governance
Failures at Universal Banks During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The Cases
of Enron and Worldcom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKING: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 97 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2007).
304
E.g., GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS (2004) (discussing the nature and costs of, and solutions to, “too big to
fail” concerns).
305
Erik F. Gerding, Bank Regulation and Securitization: How the Law Improved Transmission Lines Between Real Estate and Banking Crises, 50 GA. L.
REV. 89, 124–25 (2015).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN305.txt

2020]

unknown

REMUTUALIZATION

Seq: 61

28-JUL-20

17:16

857

subsidies to one another, leaving taxpayers ultimately responsible for the firm’s risk-taking.306
In sum, whether the constraints on capital raising that
come with alternative entity forms represents a net social cost
or a benefit is not clear cut. This calculation depends on judgments on the social costs and benefits of how financial firms
have deployed the additional capital that they raised thanks to
demutualization. Enhanced technology, competition in new
lines of business, and conglomeration are not unalloyed goods.
B. Complexity and Information
In an investment bank partnership, changing the residual
claimant alone may not be enough to curtail excessive risktaking. A partner may conclude that her or his personal expected benefits from a risky transaction may outweigh her or
his expected share of the partnership’s liability from that transaction. The partnership may thus need to impose not only
indemnification provisions on partners to protect itself from the
actions of individual partners, but also systems for partners to
monitor and control each other’s behavior.
This leads to another potential concern, namely whether
these systems would work in modern financial conglomerates
which have a wide array of business lines that are often global
in scope. It might be unrealistic to expect even sophisticated
investment bankers using modern tools of risk management to
monitor and understand other business lines, which might be
conducted in far-flung offices in any number of jurisdictions, in
detail sufficient to detect excessive risk-taking or misconduct.
This concern is mitigated by several factors. If this concern
applies to investment bank insiders, it applies doubly to regulators charged with supervising and examining firms. The
question is not whether the organizational form addresses market failures in an absolute sense, but rather whether it is an
improvement on other policy approaches. Inside partners possess comparative advantages over outside regulators in several
respects. These include better access to information on the
firm, the ability to vet new hires closely, and a range of informal
mechanisms to police each other’s conduct based on social
relationships.307
306
Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1753–55
(2011).
307
HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 96–97.
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C. Regulating Size
Moreover, if the members of an investment bank partnership are uncomfortable with the risks posed by the size and
complexity of a modern investment banking firm, they may
elect to simplify the firm. This applies equally to mutual banks
or insurance companies. Smaller firms with less opaque and
complex operations may pose less of a risk for the partners as
well as less systemic risk. More broadly, remutualization can
address concerns with the size and complexity of financial
firms, including the “too-big-to-fail” problem. If the conversion
of investment banks, mutual banks, and insurance companies
to publicly held corporations turbocharged the ability of these
firms to raise capital, acquire other firms, and expand operations globally, then reverting to the older organizational form
would throw this process into reverse. Partnerships and mutual companies will not be able to attract new equity owners as
easily. Prospective partners in an investment bank may be
concerned about liability exposure. Mutual companies can attract new equity only by signing new customers.
Remutualization offers several comparative advantages
over other solutions to limit the size of financial institutions. It
avoids thorny questions of defining the appropriate metric for
measuring inappropriate size and drawing the line for what
constitutes “too big.” No legal rules limiting or taxing size also
mean no industry gamesmanship of those rules. Remutualization also obviates the need for costly litigation to break up
conglomerates.
D. The Comparative Advantage of Organizational Form as
Regulatory Tool
This same logic explains the comparative advantages that
the use of alternative organizational forms—partnerships, mutual companies, and cooperatives—enjoys over other forms of
financial regulation more generally. The organizational form
acts structurally, by changing incentives of firms internally
rather than through external pressure. It reorders the organic
relationships among different patrons or constituencies of a
firm. As a regulatory tool, the organizational form does not
require specifying the precise favored or disfavored conduct to
be subject to a formal legal rule. It likewise requires neither
specifying the desired level of conduct (e.g., the level of firm
risk-taking, the cost of financial products to consumers, or the
level of consumer access to financial services) nor the level of a
regulatory tax. Accordingly, it is less subject to regulatory arbi-
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trage than traditional forms of prudential and consumer financial regulation. Managers have less incentive to exploit
loopholes because the entity form embeds changed incentives
into the very structure of legal relationships within the firm.
The organizational form relies on the informational advantages
of equity owners or managers over government regulators in
making decisions on desirable levels of risk-taking and consumer protection.
The organizational form also has advantages over compliance regimes. As a regulatory tool, alternative organizational
forms do not require determining whether particular procedures will achieve a substantive policy result or monitoring
whether those procedures are being followed. Instead, it creates a set of relationships among owners and managers using
liability rules, control mechanisms, and residual claimants.
Owners and managers can then craft more particularized governance structures and make decisions between themselves.
The use of partnerships and mutual companies also has
advantages over other corporate governance-based proposals
for financial reform.308 These organizational forms do not require experiments with creating new fiduciary duties for managers of the firm or new beneficiaries of fiduciary duties.
Moreover, questions in corporate law abound on the effectiveness of fiduciary duties in performing their crucial current role
in mitigating agency costs in the management-shareholder relationship. These questions would only multiply should the
scope of fiduciary duties be expanded to include reducing systemic risk or serving other stakeholders. Effective use of corporate fiduciary duties to address financial regulatory concerns
such as systemic risk would require rethinking core corporate
law doctrines, such as the business judgment rule, in fundamental ways. Corporate governance solutions might also require resolving conflicting interests of different stakeholders in
an investor-owned corporation.
Professors Hill and Painter are not alone among legal
scholars in proposing new liability regimes to curb financial
institution risk-taking and misconduct. For example, some
scholars have proposed reforms that would impose additional
308
See generally David Min, Balancing the Governance of Financial Institutions, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 743 (2017) (surveying corporate governance-based
proposals to mitigate systemic risk posed by banks). For one example of a proposal that would impose new duties on management, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 22
(2016) (advocating imposing a “public governance” duty on management of financial institutions in addition to fiduciary duties).
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losses or liability on executives or shareholders in the event of a
bank’s insolvency.309 The use of partnership and mutual
forms, however, relies not only on control or personal liability
mechanisms, but, moreover, on changing the identity of the
residual claimant. The identity of the residual claimant plays a
powerful but subsurface role in changing the incentives within
the firm.
E. The Importance of Culture
The organizational form not only changes the incentives
within the firm—the cost-benefit analysis conducted by owners, managers, and employees—it can also change the firm’s
culture. Indeed, this cultural dynamic lies at the core of the
analysis of Professors Hill and Painter on the consequences of
the shift in the investment banking industry from partnerships
to publicly traded corporations. They make a compelling case
that the partnership structure either created or reinforced a
culture of prudent risk-taking and elevating client interests.310
Reverting to partnerships and mutual companies, with the liability rules, control mechanisms, and different residual claimants that come with those organizational forms, could foster
the restoration of these older social norms. It is important to
temper expectations, however, on how dramatically or quickly
a firm or industry’s culture or norms can change.
F. Clubs, Competition, and Exclusion
Partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives represent forms
of economic clubs. These differ markedly from investor-owned
corporations with respect to ease of entry. The price of admission to ownership of a publicly traded corporation is the price
per share. By contrast, alternative entity forms may have elab309
E.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV.
409, 428 (2012) (proposing scheme in which bank shareholders would have option of either reducing firm leverage or assuming liability for bank failure); Richard Ridyard, Toward a Bank Shareholder-Orientated Model: Using Double Liability
to Mitigate Excessive Risk-Taking, 2 UCL J.L. & JURIS. 141 (2013) (advocating
return to earlier historical rules in which bank shareholders are liable upon bank
insolvency for twice their capital contribution); James Si Zeng, Internal and External Shareholder Liability in the Financial Industry: A Comparative Approach, 37
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 285 (2017) (surveying post-crisis legal rules that directly or
indirectly increase shareholder liability for financial institutions).
A large number of other proposals would address systemic risk by creative
changes to the forms of compensation for financial institution executives. See,
e.g., Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1821 (2012) (proposing paying executives in debt that would convert into
equity upon trigger event linked to firm’s deteriorating financial health).
310
HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 95–101.
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orate mechanisms to restrict entry of new owners.311 This has
social benefits when owners who would take excessive risks,
exploit customers, or break laws are kept out of the firm. However, exclusion may also occur for anticompetitive or discriminatory reasons.312 Alternative organizational forms, such as
mutuals, flourish when members have homogenous interests.313 Unfortunately, some alternative organizational forms
have also perpetuated unacceptable kinds of homogeneity
among members. Entity forms could serve as vehicles for discrimination. For example, investment bank partnerships depended upon and cultivated deep social relationships both
among partners and between partners and clients. Historically, the “old boys club” of investment bank partnerships fostered exclusion based on gender, ethnicity, race, and
religion.314 Policymakers may need to monitor the practices of
financial industry partnerships, mutuals, and cooperatives for
troubling exclusionary practices. Of course, investor-owned
corporations can also engage in anticompetitive or discriminatory behavior.315
G. Reinforcing Reputational Markets from the Inside Out
The decline of concern with firm reputation hastened the
demise of alternative entities such as investment banking partnerships, and the switch to investor-owned corporations, in
turn, further diluted the importance of firm reputation.316 The
decline of the valuation of, and investment in, firm reputation
had dire systemic consequences. Jonathan Macey makes a
compelling case that this decline contributed to waves of financial scandals and crises.317 Traditional financial regulation
311
These restrictions survive even in investment banks that have abandoned
the partnership form but retain some of the vestiges of partnerships. See, e.g.,
Craig, supra note 273 (“[B]ecoming a partner at Goldman Sachs is considered the
equivalent of winning the lottery . . . [and c]andidates are judged on many qualities, primarily their financial contribution to the firm.”).
312
Saguato, supra note 7, at 649 (discussing anticompetitive concerns associated with member-owned clearinghouses).
313
Supra notes 34, 182–83 and accompanying text.
314
HILL & PAINTER, supra note 3, at 77–78, 89.
315
See, e.g., Caroline Hudson, BofA Agrees to Pay $4.2M in Discrimination
Probe, CHARLOTTE BUSINESS JOURNAL (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.
com/charlotte/news/2019/09/30/bofa-agrees-to-pay-4-2m-in-discriminationprobe.html [https://perma.cc/433Z-6PZ2] (discussing Bank of America’s decision to pay $4.2 million after the U.S. Department of Labor found the bank
engaged in hiring discrimination).
316
Supra notes 116–36 and accompanying text.
317
JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS
BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET (2013).
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may prove an unwieldy tool to restore the value of reputation
among financial firms.318 Organizational forms provide a tantalizing alternative. Instead of regulating reputation from the
outside in, recreating older relationships among stakeholders—for example, partners in an investment bank—works from
the inside out. The entity form provides a vessel that can restore the value of firm reputation. This vessel possesses the
governance mechanisms and incubates the institutional culture necessary for that reputation.
CONCLUSION
Pushing investment banks back toward partnerships,
banks and insurance companies back toward the mutual form,
and industrywide entities toward mutualization may promote
important and elusive goals of financial policy. These forms of
remutualization may further objectives of reducing the following: financial firm risk-taking; the probability and severity of
financial firm failure; the systemic risk and other spillover
costs posed by firm failure; the exploitation of consumers, customers, and clients; and the breaking and bending of financial
laws and the commission of other misconduct. In short, alternative entities can reduce the market contracting costs of important stakeholders of the firm.
It is important to highlight at the end of this Article the
broader social goals that alternative entities do and do not
promote. At the same time, it must be underscored how many
benefits of promoting alternative entity forms can be realized
even if existing financial firms do not convert. This Article ends
by outlining several market, regulatory, and political dynamics
that may create an opening for remutualization.
A. “Corporate” Social Responsibility
There are limits to what remutualization can accomplish.
First, the benefits to remutualization outlined in this Article
come only in traditional areas of concern for financial regulation. Investment banks as partnerships and banks and insurance firms as mutually owned companies serve one or more of
the traditional objectives of financial regulation: mitigating systemic risk, protecting consumers, and promoting access to financial services. At first blush, it is not clear that
remutualization would necessarily put business entities in ser318

412.

Morrison & Wilhelm, Trust, Reputation, and Law, supra note 79, at 400–01,
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vice to the environmental and social goals and the wider set of
stakeholders that were the focus of much of Lynn Stout’s scholarship.319 Making business entities more prosocial in these
ways will need to wait for scholarship from others inspired by
her work. These scholars might explore ways to make an even
broader set of stakeholders residual claimants of a firm.
B. Conversion Not Required: Shifting Capital and a
Diversified Ecosystem
Remutualization will not prove a panacea for traditional
objectives of financial regulation; it will not address all concerns with systemic risk, market conduct and consumer protection, and consumer access. Tax and regulatory preferences
will not induce all investment banks to convert to partnerships
or all banks and insurance conglomerates to mutualize. Investment bank partnerships and mutually owned banks and
insurance firms may still take excessive risks and exploit
customers.
Even if not a panacea, remutualization would still make
financial markets more stable, safer for consumers, and more
accessible. Part of the value of remutualization lies in the diversification of the universe of financial institutions. Financial
regulations and tax rules that favor alternative organizational
forms may have value beyond causing investor-owned firms to
remutualize. Indeed, the greatest benefit of these rules may
come in encouraging capital and customer business to flow
away from investor-owned corporations and toward financial
institutions organized as partnerships, mutuals, or cooperatives. It might thus diminish the size of the herd of financial
institutions taking excessive risk, exploiting consumers, or
committing misconduct. A more diverse ecosystem of financial
institutions would expand the choices available to consumers
and the competitiveness of financial services markets. Greater
market share for financial entities with alternative organizational forms might reduce the number of firms participating in
future industry herding into speculative investments. This will
leave a larger segment of the market high and dry when the
herd reverses and financial crisis returns. Greater diversity
might also reduce the number of firms seeking to bend financial laws (via regulatory arbitrage) or break them altogether and
319
E.g., STOUT, supra note 218, at 2–4, 27–29 (outlining Stout’s attack on
shareholder primacy and contrasting stakeholders).
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thus relieve competitive pressure on other companies to follow
a race-to-the-bottom.
Diversification also allows for more experimentation and
promotes a wider set of values. Scholars such as sociologist
Marc Schneiberg have made a compelling case for the benefits
of a diverse set of organizational forms for business, including
cooperatives.320 Schneiberg argues for promoting a resurgence
of cooperatives to promote regulatory experimentation, create
new markets and improve existing ones, foster competition,
and promote sustainable economic development.321 Promoting
cooperatives and similar organizational forms enhances local
control of financial institutions and makes these firms more
responsive to consumer and community needs.322
C. Access
Some alternative entity forms—particularly mutuals, cooperatives, and nonprofit banks—might expand access to credit
and financial services for poorer communities.323 Over the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, various forms of mutually
owned and cooperative banks also dramatically expanded access to bank savings vehicles and bank credit.324 Indeed, expanded access was one of the primary reasons that mutual
banks, savings and loans (building and loans), and credit unions were created.325
As mutual banks and other lenders declined, so did this
access. The effects of the shift away from mutually owned
banks and savings and loans on access to banking is complex.
The existence of fewer mutually owned and cooperative financial institutions dedicated to providing access to lower income
customers doubtless may have had a significant impact. How320
E.g., Marc Schneiberg, Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism? Cooperative, Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterprise, 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1409, 1422–31 (2011) (making a historical argument for the value of cooperatives as an organizational form of business).
321
Id. at 1431–34.
322
Marc Schneiberg, Organizational Diversity and Regulatory Strategy in Financial Markets: Possibilities for Upgrading and Reform, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. J.
141, 160–65 (2013).
323
MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION,
AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 64–80, 85–90, 94–101 (2015) [hereinafter
BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS] (describing history of credit unions, savings and loan associations, building and loan (or thrift) banks, Morris banks, and
industrial loan companies in lending to the poor).
324
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 259.
325
For a history of the introduction of these different entities and how they
promoted access to credit, see BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS, supra note
323, at 64–80, 85–90.
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ever, some scholars have argued that mutually owned and cooperative lenders also deemphasized providing banking
services to lower income customers in favor of pursuing the
higher margins associated with a wealthier middle-class clientele.326 Together, these dynamics contributed to crisis of the
unbanked and underbanked in America lacking access to affordable savings, payments, and credit products.327
Enhanced consumer access to financial services may have
characteristics of quasi-public goods, meaning market forces
alone may underprovide this access. Consumers who are unbanked or underbanked or who lack access to credit, savings,
insurance, and payments services at reasonable costs cannot
fully participate in the economy and face barriers to full social
and political participation as a result.328 This can be particularly true for African American and other racial and ethnic
communities that suffered de jure and de facto discrimination.329 Indeed, scholars have documented the gradual but
pronounced decades-long shift of mutual banks and credit unions away from serving low-margin, low income communities.330 This suggests not only that private ordering is
insufficient to cause an optimal number of banks and insurance companies to choose the mutual form for purposes of
providing socially optimal levels of financial access, but also
that mutual firms may need additional regulatory preferences
or subsidies in order to provide—and have these preferences
conditioned upon providing—financial services to low-income
and underserved communities.
D. A Ripe Moment for Remutualization?
Four dynamics may make this a moment ripe for
remutualization.
First, an anticompetitive environment in certain financial
markets might induce market consumers to create their own
mutuals or cooperatives. The largest financial conglomerates
enjoy tremendous market power in crucial financial markets
326

Id. at 90–94.
Id. For a germinal analysis of the problem of poor Americans lacking
access to banking services, see Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON
REG. 121, 134–40 (2004).
328
See Barr, supra note 327, at 123–25 (describing the barriers preventing
many low-income individuals from accessing the mainstream financial and the
ramifications of that lack of access).
329
MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP 4–6 (2017).
330
BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS supra note 323, at 146.
327
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such as derivatives dealing.331 Many policymakers and scholars decry restricted competition among banks and other financial institutions,332 whereas a few see it as complementary to
goals of financial stability.333 One thing is clear: impaired competition creates conditions ripe for consumer cooperatives.
Faced with monopolistic or limited competition among producers, consumers have strong incentives to form cooperatives to
reduce their welfare loss and create a substitute for an imperfect market.334
Second, regulatory failures may undermine one of the historic reasons for the rise of investor-owned corporations at the
expense of mutual. Looking back in history, the first comprehensive legal and effective federal and state regimes regulating
banking and insurance undermined the competitive advantage
enjoyed by mutual firms in those industries. Bank depositors
and insurance policyholders could then rely on regulation to
ensure the solvency of those respective financial institutions
and to reduce opportunism by management. The relative importance of the organizational form as a regulatory tool was
thus diminished.335 By contrast, at this historical moment, the
effectiveness of regulation in constraining the risk-taking of
financial institutions remains shrouded by doubt. Accordingly,
the regulatory use of alternative organizational forms may be
primed for a comeback.
Doubts about government regulatory regimes meshes with
a third dynamic that creates conditions ripe for remutualization: the widespread public distrust of large banks and financial conglomerates and of corporations in general has not
abated since the end of the global financial crisis. The measured success of the Bank Transfer Day/Dump Your Bank Day
movements, while not enough to alter radically the market
share in favor of credit unions,336 does highlight the political
331
Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial
Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 266, 277 (2012).
332
E.g., Brett Christophers, Banking and Competition in Exceptional Times, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 563, 570–72, 574–75 (2013) (linking competition concerns to
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attractiveness of cooperatives and mutuals. This political dynamic could support efforts either to restore the old tax advantages and regulatory preferences enjoyed by financial
institutions organized as mutuals or to create new ones. It
could also support regulatory preferences for the older, conservative model of investment banks as partnerships. Social
movements promoted earlier historical waves of mutualization
in finance and other sectors.337 Future social movements
could channel public antipathy toward financial conglomerates
and corporations toward support for remutualization.
Fourth, the current political climate might incubate a deep
public affinity for cooperatives, mutuals, and partnerships.
These organizational forms not only promote traditional goals
of financial regulation, they may also reflect traditional, communitarian values in which risk is mutualized and borne by
the parties that create it, governance is shared, and a greater
number of institutions are ultimately owned by their employees
or the customers they serve.
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1900–1930, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS REVISITED VOL: 19, 39 (Michael
Lounsbury & Marc J. Ventresca eds., 2002).
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